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The United States Navy has completed the initial flight test of a Reconfigurable 
Control Law System (RCLAWS) on the F/A-18C.  The purpose of reconfigurable control 
is to allow for the safe operation of an aircraft that has experienced a sudden change in 
aircraft dynamics resulting from aircraft damage or flight control effector damage.  The 
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the production flight control system instead of replacing it.  In order to reduce 
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response to model data of the aircraft’s desired response, the RCLAWS determines what 
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Flight test data have been collected to determine the viability of the in-line retrofit 
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RCLAWS provide substantial improvements for more aggressive failures.  Simulation 
shows RCLAWS has proven to reduce the aircrew workload in a recent catastrophic 





The following thesis is a highly revised version of a paper by the name of 
“Research Flight Test of a Retrofit Reconfigurable Flight Control System” presented at 
the 37th Annual Society of Flight Test Engineers symposium in 2006 by Dean Meloney, 
Dr. Anthony Page and Matthew Doyle: 
 
Meloney, D., Page, A., and Doyle, M., “Research Flight Test of a Retrofit 
Reconfigurable Flight Control System,” SFTE, 37th Annual International Symposium, 
Reno, NV, September 2006.
 
My primary contributions to this paper include (1) simulation and in-flight data 
collection, (2) post-flight analysis of pilot handling quality ratings, (3) aircraft technical 
and historical expertise, (4) flight test maneuver selection and refinement, (5) collecting 
various contributions into a single document, and (6) assisting in writing and editing of 
the simulation and flight test results portions.  
 
Information contained in this thesis is unclassified and was obtained through the 
author’s participation in a Department of Defense F/A-18 flight test project and its 
associated reports and manuals.  Any conclusions, recommendations and opinions 
presented within this document are the opinion of the author and should not be 
interpreted as that of the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, VX-23 or the 
University of Tennessee Space Institute.   
 
Public Release, 265SPR-133.06. DoD Directive 5230.24 – DISTRIBUTION 
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 1 
RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL AND THE F/A-18C........................ 2 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT 
CONTROL SYSTEMS..................................................................................................... 5 
OVERVIEW OF RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS.......... 5 
PARALLEL RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
................................................................................................................................. 6 
IN-LINE RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS... 6 
CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF TEST AIRPLANE AND TEST EQUIPMENT.. 9 
F/A-18C DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................... 9 
FLEET SUPPORT FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTERS...................................... 9 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM DESIGN ................................................................ 9 
HARDWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ........................................... 11 
SOFTWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE............................................. 12 
HARDWARE ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE INTERFACES............... 12 
COMMAND FADING ............................................................................. 13 
VERSION 3.1.6 FSFCC MODULES................................................................... 13 
RCLAWS MODULE................................................................................ 13 
SLIM CONTROL LAWS......................................................................... 15 
FAILURE SIM MODULE ....................................................................... 15 
FSFCC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES........................................................... 16 
TABLE/ROW NUMBER SELECTION, ENGAGEMENT AND 
DISENGAGEMENT ................................................................................ 16 
701E ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC ......................................... 16 
FSFCC/RCLAWS OPERATING MODES .............................................. 17 
CHAPTER 4: SIMULATION TEST PLANNING...................................................... 19 
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 19 
TEST ENVELOPE ............................................................................................... 19 
TEST CONFIGURATION ................................................................................... 20 
NRT SIMULATION METHOD OF TEST.......................................................... 20 
PILOTED SIMULATION AND HILS METHOD OF TEST.............................. 20 
CHAPTER 5: SIMULATION TEST RESULTS......................................................... 23 
SOFTWARE TESTING RESULTS..................................................................... 23 
RUDDER PEDAL MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION ............................. 24 
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP RESULTS............................................................ 24 
CHAPTER 6: FLIGHT TEST PLANNING................................................................. 28 
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 28 
TEST ENVELOPE ............................................................................................... 28 
FLIGHT CLEARANCE ISSUES......................................................................... 29 
TEST CONFIGURATION AND LOADOUT ..................................................... 30 
METHOD OF TEST............................................................................................. 30 
INSTRUMENTATION AND REAL TIME MONITORING.............................. 30 
REAL TIME DATA REQUIREMENTS ............................................................. 31 
CHAPTER 7: FLIGHT TEST RESULTS.................................................................... 32 
vii 
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 32 
UNANTICIPATED AIRCRAFT RESPONSE..................................................... 32 
OVERALL HANDLING QUALITIES RESULTS.............................................. 33 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS .............................................................................. 38 
ADDITIONAL RCLAWS CONTRIBUTION TO THE F/A-18C....................... 40 
CHAPTER 8: F/A-18C REAL WORLD FLEET APPLICATIONS......................... 41 
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 41 
LEF FAILURE BACKGROUND ........................................................................ 41 
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND OUT OF CONTROL FLIGHT ...................... 42 
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL 
SIMULATION PLANNING ................................................................................ 44 
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL 
SIMULATION SESSION .................................................................................... 45 
INBOARD LEF FAILURES WITH RCLAWS RESULTS................................. 48 
RECOMMENDED RCLAWS IMPLEMENTATION FOR LEF FAILURES.... 49 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................... 52 
CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................... 52 
RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................... 53 
ALL AXIS RECONFIGURABLE CONTROL........................................ 53 
INCREASE TEST ENVELOPE............................................................... 53 
AIRCRAFT INCORPORATION ............................................................. 53 
THRUST CONTRIBUTIONS.................................................................. 54 
FUTURE OF FSFCC TESTING .............................................................. 54 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 55 
APPENDICES................................................................................................................. 58 
APPENDIX A: FIGURES.............................................................................................. 59 
APPENDIX B: TABLES ................................................................................................ 65 
APPENDIX C: FCS DIFFERENCES........................................................................... 80 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: FSFCC TABLE AND ROW NUMBERS ...................................................... 18 
TABLE 2: CR FLIGHT TEST HQRS FOR PILOT D..................................................... 34 
TABLE 3: PA FLIGHT TEST HQR’S FOR PILOT D.................................................... 35 
TABLE 4: FLIGHT TEST HQRS FOR PILOT E............................................................ 36 
TABLE B-1: ENVELOPE ENGAGE LIMITS ................................................................ 66 
TABLE B-2: SYSTEM STATUS ARMING AND ENGAGING CRITERIA ................ 68 
TABLE B-3: FSFCC VERSION 3.1.6 MODE SELECTIONS ....................................... 69 
TABLE B-4:DETAILED TEST MATRIX ...................................................................... 75 
TABLE B-5: FLIGHT TEST MANEUVER DESCRIPTIONS AND TOLERANCES .. 79 
TABLE C-1: SUMMARY OF 10.1/10.3/10.5.1 FCS DIFFERENCES........................... 82 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: F/A-18C HYDRAULIC MALFUNCTION REFERENCE CHART.............. 4 
FIGURE 2: PARALLEL RETROFIT CONTROL DESIGN............................................. 7 
FIGURE 3: IN-LINE RETROFIT CONTROL DESIGN................................................... 7 
FIGURE 4: THREE VIEW OF THE F/A-18A/B/C/D HORNET.................................... 10 
FIGURE 5: F/A-18C FCS COMPONENTS .................................................................... 11 
FIGURE 6: FSFCC 701E/1750A SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE................................ 12 
FIGURE 7: FTFCS DISPLAY ......................................................................................... 14 
FIGURE 8: COMMAND FADE BETWEEN 701E AND 1750A ................................... 14 
FIGURE 9: TOP LEVEL ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE BLOCK DIAGRAM ........... 17 
FIGURE 10: NRT SIMULATION, PILOTED SIMULATION AND HILS TEST 
ENVELOPE.............................................................................................................. 19 
FIGURE 11: NRT SIMULATION AND PILOTED SIMULATION CONTROL 
SURFACE FAILURES ............................................................................................ 21 
FIGURE 12: HILS AND FLIGHT TEST CONTROL SURFACE FAILURES.............. 22 
FIGURE 13: SOFTWARE SIMULATION RESULTS, PRODUCTION CAS, PILOT B, 
ALL MANEUVERS................................................................................................. 25 
FIGURE 14: SOFTWARE SIMULATION RESULTS, RETROFIT CONTROL, PILOT 
B, ALL MANEUVERS ............................................................................................ 25 
FIGURE 15: 1750A RESEARCH PROCESSOR MEMORY AVAILABLE FOR 
RCLAWS.................................................................................................................. 26 
FIGURE 16: HILS TEST RESULTS FOR PRODUCTION CAS, PILOT C, ALL 
MANEUVERS.......................................................................................................... 27 
FIGURE 17: HILS TEST RESULTS FOR RETROFIT CONTROL, PILOT C, ALL 
MANEUVERS.......................................................................................................... 27 
FIGURE 18: FLIGHT TEST ENVELOPE....................................................................... 29 
FIGURE 19: FLIGHT TEST RESULTS FOR BASELINE CONTROL, PILOTS D & E, 
ALL MANEUVERS................................................................................................. 37 
FIGURE 20: FLIGHT TEST RESULTS FOR RETROFIT CONTROL, PILOTS D & E, 
ALL MANEUVERS................................................................................................. 37 
FIGURE 21: PRODUCTION CAS, +15 DEGREE AILERON FAILURE, PITCH 
DOUBLETS.............................................................................................................. 39 
FIGURE 22: RCLAWS, +15 DEGREE AILERON FAILURE, PITCH DOUBLETS ... 39 
FIGURE 23: CASTLE SIMULATION, PILOT STICK POSITION WITH 
PRODUCTION CONTROL LAWS AND LEF FAILURE..................................... 50 
FIGURE 24: CASTLE SIMULATION, PILOT STICK POSITION WITH RCLAWS 
AND LEF FAILURE................................................................................................ 50 
FIGURE A-1 COOPER HARPER HANDLING QUALITIES RATING SCALE.......... 60 
FIGURE A-2: COMBINED PILOTED SIMULATION HQRS ...................................... 61 
FIGURE A-3: CASTLE SIMULATION SCORING CRITERIA.................................... 62 
FIGURE A-4: F/A-18 CASTLE SIMULATION RESULTS FOR NRT TRANSONIC 
TEST POINT (30,000 FEET AND 0.9 MACH) ...................................................... 63 
FIGURE A-5: F/A-18 CASTLE SIMULATION RESULTS FOR NRT CLASS B TEST 
POINT (20,000 FEET AND 0.3 MACH)................................................................. 64 
x 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AAW Active Aeroelastic Wing 
ACTIVE Advanced Control Technology for Integrated 
 Vehicles 
ADC Air Data Computer 
ADS Autopilot Disconnect Switch (paddle switch) 
AOA Angle of Attack 
ASM Actuator Signal Management 
BAI Barron Associates, Incorporate 
BIT Built In Test 
BLIN BIT Logic Inspection (Fault Code) 
CAS Control Augmentation System 
CASTLE Controls Analysis and Simulation Test Loop 
 Environment 
CCDL Cross Check Data Link 
CR Cruise Configuration  
DAF Dial-A-Function 
DDAS Digital Data Acquisition System 
DDI Digital Display Indicator  
DEL Direct Electrical Link 
DFBW Digital Fly By Wire 
DMOT Detailed Method of Test 
DPRAM Dual-Port Random Access Memory 
FCC Flight Control Computer 
FCS Flight Control System 
FSFCC Fleet Support Flight Control Computer 
FQ Flying Qualities 
g Gravitational Acceleration 
HARV High Angle of Attack Research Vehicle 
HIDEC Highly Integrated Digital Electronic Control 
HILS Hardware in the Loop Simulation 
Hp Pressure Altitude 
HQR Handling Quality Ratings 
HUD Heads Up Display 
HYD Hydraulic 
IBIT Initiated Built In Test 
IFCS Intelligent Flight Control System 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
INS ATT Inertial Navigation System Attitude 
IRIG Inter-Range Instrumentation Group 
ISM Input Signal Management 
ITS Integrated Test Set  
KCAS Knots Calibrated Airspeed 
LAU Launcher (missile) 
LED Leading Edge Down 
xi 
LEF Leading Edge Flap 
LEU Leading Edge Up 
LMCS Lockheed Martin Control Systems 
MC Mission Computer 
MECH Mechanical Link 
MFS Manned Flight Simulator 
MHz Megahertz 
ModSDF Modular Six Degree of Freedom 
MUX Multiplex 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATOPS Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures  
 Standardization 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NROTC Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps 
NRT Non-Real Time 
NWS Nose Wheel Steering 
Nz Load Factor 
OFP Operation Flight Program 
PA Powered Approach Configuration 
PBIT Periodic Built In Test 
PCM Pulse Code Modulation 
PIO Pilot Induced Oscillation 
PSF Pounds per Square Foot (dynamic pressure) 
PSFCC Production Support Flight Control Computers 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RCLAWS Reconfigurable Control Laws 
RLS Reservoir Level Sensing 
RSRI Rolling Surface to Rudder Interconnect 
RTPS Real-time Telemetry Processing System 
SBIR Small Business Innovative Research 
SDC Self-Designing Controller 
SEC Source Error Correction 
SRFCS Self Repairing Flight Control System 
SSE Simulated Single Engine 
TED Trailing Edge Down 
TEF Trailing Edge Flap 
TEU Trailing Edge Up 
TISM Test Instrumentation Support Module 
UA Up/Auto (Flaps and Gear up) 
USS United States Ship 
v10.1 Version 10.1 (Flight Control OFP) 
v10.5.1 Version 10.5.1 (Flight Control OFP) 
v10.7 Version 10.7 (Flight Control OFP) 
VISTA Variable-Stability In-Flight Simulator Test Aircraft 
VFA Strike Fighter Squadron 
1 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
BACKGROUND 
During the early days of flight, aircrew controlled aircraft motion via cables 
and/or rods that connected the flight control surfaces to the pilot controls.  With the 
advent of the jet era, the control surfaces required more force to displace due to higher 
dynamic loads and larger control surfaces.  These changes necessitated the advent of the 
hydraulic-mechanical flight control system.  These systems utilized the mechanical 
advantage of hydraulics to drive the actuators of the control surfaces.  The actuators, 
however, were still physically connected to the pilot controls, usually via push/pull rods 
or cables. 
When the electronics era ensued, engineers were determined to develop a method 
to replace the heavy, unreliable cables and rods with an electronic flight control system.  
The first Digital Fly By Wire (DFBW) aircraft was flown on May 25, 1972.  The test bed 
for this ground breaking technology was a National Aeronautic and Space Administration 
(NASA) F-8 Crusader that had been extensively modified with an electronic flight 
control system controlled via a digital computer (NASA TN-7843, 1974).  Now, instead 
of cables and rods, the flight control actuators were only connected to the pilot control 
inputs via wires and a flight control computer. 
Most modern military high performance aircraft from the F-16 Falcon and the 
F/A-18 Hornet to the F/A-22 Raptor and even many commercial aircraft have utilized 
this fly by wire technology.  Fly by wire technology has allowed additional innovation in 
the field of flight controls.  In earlier, conventionally controlled aircraft, when a flight 
control surface failed due to actuator failure or aircraft damage, the aircrew had to either 
quickly learn to fly the new, unknown flight control system or attempt to egress the 
aircraft prior to crashing.  With fly by wire technology and an understanding of control 
system modeling and response, the aircrew now has other options. 
Reconfigurable flight control is one such option upon which aircrew can now rely 
upon.  Reconfigurable flight control techniques endeavor to eliminate undesired motion 
(e.g., axis coupling) that can result from aircraft damage or flight control failure.  Failures 
have occurred that have left aircraft in a flyable state.  However, pilots could not always 
control and safely land the aircraft as a result of insufficient time to learn the vastly 
different dynamics of the new system.  The benefits of flight control reconfiguration to 
aid the pilot in these situations have been well established (Page, et al, 2006 and 
Tomayko, 2003).  Due to the considerable verification and validation efforts required to 
certify flight control software, however, the techniques have been slow to transition to 
production platforms.  To help address the certification issue, some researchers have 
started examining retrofit reconfigurable control methods that are designed to upgrade, 
rather than replace, the existing control laws of current production aircraft. 
The retrofit control architecture recently tested at Naval Air Station (NAS) 
Patuxent River is one such system.  Through a Small Business Innovative Research 
(SBIR) contract, Barron Associates, Incorporated (BAI) developed the control algorithms 
and supported the United States Navy during all phases of testing throughout this 
program.  This architecture is unique because it affects reconfiguration by modifying the 
pilot control stick and rudder commands instead of control surfaces directly.  By 
comparing sensor data of the aircraft’s actual response to model data of the aircraft’s 
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nominal response, the Reconfigurable Flight Control Laws (RCLAWS) determine what 
additions need to be made to the pilot’s commands to produce the desired aircraft 
response. 
RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL AND THE F/A-18C 
A large part of the design philosophy behind most combat aircraft, including the 
F/A-18C, is survivability.  Unfortunately, reconfigurable flight control was in its infancy 
during the development and testing of the F/A-18.  Even without reconfigurable control 
as defined today, the developers were able to provide aircrew several means to control 
the aircraft during flight control or sub-system failures. 
The F/A-18C flight control system (FCS) is a fly by wire system that contains 
multiple back-up modes to the primary control augmentation system (CAS) such as direct 
electrical link (DEL) and mechanical link (MECH).  DEL is a back-up mode that 
contains both a digital and analog operating mode for aileron and rudder control.  DEL 
allows aircraft control in all three axes in the event of a CAS failure.  If the DEL mode 
fails, the FCS secondary back-up mode is MECH, which provides a direct mechanical 
linkage to the horizontal stabilators for pitch and roll control.  When operating in any of 
these degraded modes, the aircraft is much more susceptible to pilot induced oscillations 
(PIO), sideslip excursions and large pitch transients.  The author’s experience with these 
modes has been limited to the simulator.  Even though flying qualities are severely 
degraded in some cases, the control of the aircraft was not in question and a safe, 
simulated landing was made each time as long as the aircraft was flown in the 
recommended envelope.   
The F/A-18C also has failure modes for the leading edge flaps (LEFs) and trailing 
edge flaps (TEFs).  However, unlike DEL or MECH modes which provide roll, pitch and 
yaw control during CAS failures, when a failure exists that affects automatic flap 
scheduling, they are commanded to a known flyable configuration.  For example, with a 
single LEF failure with the flap in the AUTO position (up), the LEF and TEF symmetric 
commands will freeze, however the differential LEF commands will continue and allow 
the operational LEF to schedule as appropriate.  In flaps HALF or FULL, the failed LEF 
will freeze, while the remaining LEF and TEFs will schedule normally.  In the event of a 
catastrophic failure in the hydraulic drive unit shaft, the LEFs are designed to fail to 
approximately 5 degrees leading edge up (LEU) by use of a specifically designed 
transmission and brake.  Testing has shown that all of these LEF failure cases are 
controllable and a safe landing can be made.  However, events in the past several years 
have shown that in some cases the transmission fails to stop the LEF at 5 degrees LEU 
and the results have been catastrophic.  More discussion will be devoted to this topic 
during the real world application section, chapter 8.  TEF failure modes are much simpler 
and result in both the TEFs being commanded to zero degrees.  Although this results in 
higher than normal approach speeds and degraded approach characteristics in pitch and 
roll, this configuration is considered controllable. 
In addition to the FCS having multiple back-up modes, the hydraulic (HYD) 
system that drives the control surfaces in their normal operating mode is also highly 
redundant.  The F/A-18C has two separate HYD systems that drive the flight control 
surfaces.  Every flight control surface with the exception of the speed brake is backed up 
on both HYD systems.  In addition, each HYD system, denoted HYD 1 and HYD 2, is 
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split into two circuits denoted A and B, i.e., HYD 1A, HYD 1B, HYD 2A and HYD 2B.  
The F/A-18C HYD system incorporates further redundancy in the form of a reservoir 
level sensing (RLS) system.  The RLS system attempts to prevent excessive loss in 
hydraulic fluid and thus actuator functionality by attempting to isolate the leak in a single 
circuit.  For example, if there is a leak in the right LEF actuator that is normally driven by 
the HYD 2A system, the RLS system will secure the A circuit at approximately 60% 
reservoir capacity, but will allow HYD 2B to continue to function.  If this did not secure 
the loss of fluid (which it should in the example of the right LEF), when the reservoir 
reaches 32%, the A circuit will open and the B circuit will close in an attempt to isolate 
the leak.  At 4%, both circuits come back on line and all fluid will be lost in that system.  
With the combination of the two separate HYD systems, the individual circuits in each 
system and the RLS system, the F/A-18 is flyable with the vast majority of hydraulic 
system emergences as shown in Figure 1.  The author’s experience during hydraulic 
malfunctions, both in flight and in simulation, resulted in degraded handling qualities due 
to the sometimes non-symmetric flight control surface deflections and the resulting 
coupling in the other axes. 
When the author was initially approached with this project, his first response was 
that the F/A-18 already had multiple back-up modes and redundancy built into the basic 
flight controls and airframe systems, therefore it appeared to be unnecessary to test 
reconfigurable flight control on an F/A-18.  The author certainly did not expect to 
discover vastly improved handling qualities.  Fortunately, after further study and 
completion of multiple simulator and flight tests, the author realized that his initial 
opinion that reconfigurable flight control was inapplicable to the F/A-18C and other 
highly redundant fly by wire aircraft was absolutely incorrect.  This paper will discuss the 
methods to safely and efficiently test a new in-line retrofit module.  In addition, it will 
discuss the results and the added benefits of reconfigurable flight control on extremely 
redundant aircraft such as the F/A-18C, including a real world application. 
 
 





Chapter 2: Background of Retrofit Reconfigurable Flight Control 
Systems 
OVERVIEW OF RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
In December 1989, NASA Ames Research Center performed the first 
demonstration of real time reconfiguration on a high performance fighter aircraft (Stewart 
and Shuck, 1990 and Tomayko, 2003).  These flights were flown on the NASA F-15 
Highly Integrated Digital Electronic Control (HIDEC) Flight Research aircraft.  This 
demonstration utilized the inherent fault detection capabilities built into modern fly by 
wire aircraft and took advantage of the excess control power and surface displacements 
provided by the aircraft’s large flight envelope to modify flight control surface 
displacement to preserve aircraft stability in the event of a failure.  This demonstration 
was known as the Self-Repairing Flight Control System (SRFCS).  This method, 
however, required knowledge of flight control system health to respond correctly to any 
malfunctions.   
Reconfiguration via adaptive control presents an alternative to failure detection 
that does not require knowledge of the characteristics of the failures.  In 1996, an F-16 
flying a Self-Designing Controller (SDC) demonstrated an adaptive approach using a 
time-varying model of the aircraft dynamics in coordination with a model used to show 
the desired response to drive the control surfaces to achieve the desired aircraft state 
(Ward, et al, 1998).  The most recent example of reconfigurable flight took place from 
1996 to 1999 when NASA’s F-15 Advanced Control Technology for Integrated Vehicles 
(ACTIVE) aircraft flew a follow on to the SFRCS project.  This project was referred to as 
the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) (Monaco et al, 2004 and Tomayko, 2003).  
This system was similar to the SDC demonstration in that prior knowledge of flight 
control failures was not required for reconfiguration.  In addition, the F-15 ACTIVE 
aircraft incorporated a propulsion-controlled aircraft (PCA) system that allowed the 
aircraft to land without utilizing the flight control system (Burcham et al, 1999).  Each 
reconfigurable flight control system introduced in these examples replaced the pre-
existing flight control system, however, and typically required significant aircraft 
modifications.   
Even with numerous demonstrations and advancing technologies, these systems 
have not been integrated into newer aircraft.  Several reasons exist for the slow 
acceptance of reconfigurable flight controls, including the expense associated with 
integration into a known flight control system and the costs and time associated with the 
verification and validation of this new technology.  Furthermore, aircraft designers have 
been unwilling to depart from the proven systems already installed in the aircraft (Page, 
et al, 2006).  Several companies have attempted to mitigate the risks associated with 
reconfigurable flight control by introducing an add-on, retrofit module that modifies 
instead of replacing existing flight controls.  This modification delivers the benefits of 
reconfigurable flight without the expense, time and risks associated with replacing entire 
flight control systems.  There are currently two methods to implement a retrofit 
reconfigurable control system, parallel and in-line, which are described below. 
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PARALLEL RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
One method to implement a retrofit control law is possible through the 
modification of the output of the existing (production) control law, as shown in Figure 2.  
Because the retrofit control module can perform its calculations at the same time as the 
production control laws, this method is referred to as “parallel” implementation.  In the 
standard implementation of the parallel system, instead of the retrofit control laws 
performing their calculations independent of, and simultaneous with, the existing control 
laws, the retrofit control module utilizes the output of the production control laws, as 
depicted by the dashed line in Figure 2.  The control module then augments the output of 
the production controller to actuate the control surfaces (Monaco et al, 2004).  The 
greatest advantage of the parallel architecture is that there are typically more 
aerodynamic surfaces (flight control effectors) that can be manipulated to achieve the 
desired aircraft response than aircrew controls (flight control inceptors).  For example, 
including only aerodynamic control surfaces (without engine effects and excluding the 
speed brake), the F/A-18C has ten surfaces that can either individually or in combination 
affect the flight path of the aircraft and only a simple control stick and rudder pedals for 
aircrew inputs.  Therefore, the parallel architecture has a greater capability to handle a 
wider variety of aircraft failures than similar architectures that do not directly control the 
aerodynamic control surfaces.  For this reason, much of the reconfigurable flight control 
testing has concentrated on the parallel method.  The Self-Designing Controller, flown in 
1996 on the Variable-Stability In-Flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA) F-16 operated 
by Calspan exemplifies a successful parallel retrofit control system (Ward, et al, 1998).  
During this experiment, the aircraft landed successfully with a simulated elevon failure. 
In spite of these benefits, this method also has created complications in the 
verification and validation of these systems.  The parallel architecture allows the retrofit 
control laws to overwrite the production control laws if necessary to maintain the desired 
state.  Therefore, one must verify and validate both the production control laws and the 
retrofit control laws instead of only the production control laws 
IN-LINE RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Another method of implementation a retrofit control law is also possible through 
the modification of the pilot input prior to the existing control laws, as shown in Figure 3.  
This implementation of retrofit control laws requires that the retrofit control module 
perform its calculations prior to the existing control laws, hence this method is referred to 
as an “in-line” or “series” approach.  From aircraft sensor data, the retrofit control 
module modifies the control inputs prior to the production control laws to achieve the 
desired aircraft system response.  Thus, one major advantage of the in-line architecture is 
that the production control laws are still in control of the control surfaces.  As a result, 
any safety features such as command limiting, structural filtering and safety logic are still 
in effect (Monaco et al, 2004).  
The in-line method allows for slightly easier verification and validation as a 
retrofit system because production control laws still retain end control of the aircraft.  
Unfortunately, however, this implementation creates several deficiencies.  As stated 
above for the parallel method, there are typically more control surfaces (effectors) than 
control inputs (inceptors).  Therefore, the in-line method is less powerful because it has 
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Figure 3: In-Line Retrofit Control Design 
 
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable 







if the pilot cannot command the desired flight control surface response, then the in-line 
retrofit reconfigurable method can not accomplish it.  The in-line method was utilized for 
the test flight program described in this paper.
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Chapter 3: Description of Test Airplane and Test Equipment  
F/A-18C DESCRIPTION 
The F/A-18C airplane is a single-seat, high performance, twin engine, supersonic 
fighter and attack airplane manufactured by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (now 
Boeing, St. Louis), as shown in Figure 4.  The airplane is characterized by moderately 
swept, variable camber mid-mounted wings, twin vertical stabilizers mounted forward of 
the horizontal stabilators (canted outboard 20 degrees), and wing leading edge extensions 
mounted on each side of the fuselage from the wing roots to just forward of the 
windscreen.  The airplane is configured with full span leading edge flaps, inboard trailing 
edge flaps, and outboard ailerons on each wing.  The flight control system consists of two 
digital flight control computers with two 701E processors that utilize a full authority 
control augmentation system to operate the hydraulically driven control surfaces.  Pilot 
interface for the flight control system is through a conventional, center mounted control 
stick, rudder pedals and dual engine throttles on the left console.  Spring cartridges in all 
axes are designed to provide the pilot control stick and rudder feel.  The F/A-18C 
airplane is powered by two General Electric F404-GE-400 or -402 augmented turbofan 
engines. 
FLEET SUPPORT FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTERS 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM DESIGN 
The Fleet Support Flight Control Computer (FSFCC) system, originally 
designated the Production Support Flight Control Computer (PSFCC), consists of a set of 
modified F/A-18A/B/C/D Flight Control Computers (FCCs) (Carter and Stephenson, 
1999 and NAWCAD RTR, 1999).  The modified computers contain an additional 1750A 
processor in each channel of each FCC.  This arrangement allows engineers to flight test 
experimental flight control laws on the 1750A processor.  A key safety feature of this 
arrangement is that the 701E processor is available at all times to resume control of the 
aircraft with a known, certified set of control laws.  The FSFCC provides the United 
States Navy with the capability to flight test experimental flight control laws in a very 
cost efficient manner by reducing the upfront validation and verification requirements 
normally associated with flight critical software.  In addition, they allow for increased 
flexibility to make rapid software changes without extensive regression testing.  These 
modified FCCs replace standard FCCs and interface with the rest of the FCS components 
in the same manner as the standard system, as shown in Figure 5. 
The FSFCCs are designed to automatically return control to the standard 701E 
processor based on aircraft envelope checks and flight control system health status.  In 
addition to the automatic disengage capability, the pilot can also manually revert to the 
standard 701E processor via the Autopilot Disconnect Switch (ADS), more commonly 
known as the paddle switch, at any time.  Features of the FSFCC system include: 
a. Baseline Version 10.1 (v10.1) flight control laws always available to resume 
control of the aircraft. 
b. Compatible with any fleet F/A-18A/B/C/D with Mission Computer (MC) dial-a-
function (DAF) software. 
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Figure 5: F/A-18C FCS Components 
 
Source: Carter, J., and Stephenson, M., “Initial Flight Testing of the Production Support 




c. No special hardware or additional sensors, interfaces or buses required 
d. Uses existing DAF for module activation and parameter modification. 
e. Allows easily programmable test-specific disengage criteria as well as manual 
disengage capability through the existing paddle switch. 
f. Supports rapid prototyping through Ada software development. 
HARDWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The FSFCC hardware architecture is the same as that used for NASA’s F/A-18 
High Angle-of-Attack Research Vehicle (HARV) program (Carter and Stephenson, 
1999).  Lockheed Martin Control Systems (LMCS) modified a standard F/A-18 701E 
FCC chipset to accommodate a 40 MHz PACE (Performance Semiconductor 
Corporation, Sunnyvale, CA) 1750A processor, an analog #6 board and an additional 
analog I/O #2 board.  The analog #6 and analog I/O #2 boards are not currently used but 
are available for future growth.  The 701E is always responsible for and retains complete 
and direct control of all actuators through the Actuator Signal Management (ASM) 
module.  The 701E is always operating in parallel with the 1750A so it may resume 
control of the aircraft at any time.  The system is identical to a standard F/A-18 FCC 
executing v10.1 control laws when 1750A processor is not engaged.  When the 1750A is 
engaged, the 701E Operational Flight Program (OFP) uses a transient free switch to 
replace the 701E actuator commands with the 1750A commands. 
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SOFTWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The 701E changes required for FSFCC affected the Executive, Input Signal 
Management (ISM), ASM, Data Management, Built-In-Test (BIT), and the inner loop 
control laws.  A diagram of some of these components along with the interface to the 
1750A is shown in Figure 6.  
Changes were made to the 701E Executive to control 1750A arming and 
engaging, as well as modification to the cross-channel data link (CCDL) transfer tests.  
ISM was modified to execute CCDL transfer of FSFCC specific parameters. ASM was 
modified to allow 1750A commands to be used instead of the standard 701E commands.  
Fade logic was also added to ASM for mode transitions between 701E and 1750A 
commands providing transient suppression.  Data Management was changed to provide 
additional FSFCC specific 1553 data.  Periodic BIT (PBIT) was modified to test the 
Dual-Port Random Access Memory (DPRAM) and the 701E/1750A interface. 
Communication between the 701E and 1750A is accomplished through the 
DPRAM interface.  Selected sensor input data, cockpit discrete states, 701E commands, 
surface positions, and FCC internal variables are placed in DPRAM by the 701E for use 
by the 1750A.  The 1750A writes its actuator commands, status and 1553 data into 
DPRAM for use by the 701E and transmittal on the 1553 data bus.  
HARDWARE ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE INTERFACES  
Operation of FSFCC requires the use of several aircraft components. From the cockpit, 
the pilot utilizes the Digital Display Indicator (DDI) to load FSFCC table and row codes 
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Figure 6: FSFCC 701E/1750A Software Architecture 
 
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable 





six letter code using the DAF B, C, and D buttons on the Flight Test Flight Control 
System (FTFCS) display, shown in Figure 7.  Each FSFCC table and row number 
combination designates either parameter modification or module activation.  The 1750A 
processor can then be armed by pressing the DAF A button.  The Nose Wheel Steering 
(NWS) button is used to engage the 1750A processor, and the pilot can confirm 
engagement on the DDI.  The paddle switch is used by the pilot to manually disengage 
the FSFCC.  If the system automatically disengages, the Master Caution light is 
illuminated, an FCS caution is displayed on the DDI, and an audible tone is heard in the 
pilot's headset.  The MC and the FSFCC process the pilot's DDI inputs and feeds them to 
the 1750A processor via the 1553 bus and the DPRAM. 
COMMAND FADING 
Command fading is accomplished using transient free switch logic from the 
standard F/A-18A/B/C/D control laws.  A linear transition between the 701E to the 
1750A command occurs over a preset fade rate.  A representation of the command fading 
that occurs following disengage is presented in Figure 8.  The same command fading 
occurs for the engagement sequence (701E to 1750A) as disengage (1750A to 701E).  
Default fade rates for all 1750A surface commands was 1.1 seconds in FSFCC Version 
3.1.6 OFP and subsequent utilized for this testing.  
During engagement of the FSFCC, 701E trim values are transferred to the 1750A 
and used to prevent large transients during engagement.  The 701E sets trim values to 
zero after the transfer.  However, upon disengaging the 1750A, the trim values are not 
transferred back to the 701E, so a trim transient resulted on several occasions.  This 
transient was on the order of +/- 1g. 
VERSION 3.1.6 FSFCC MODULES 
FSFCC software version 3.1.6 contains three modules: the RCLAWS, the Slim 
Control Laws, and the Failure Simulation modules. 
RCLAWS MODULE 
The RCLAWS module makes comparisons between the aircraft sensor outputs 
and the predicted response to the pilot’s inputs.  When active, the RCLAWS modifies the 
pilot’s inputs to better produce the intended aircraft response.  For example, a pure 
longitudinal stick pull would normally result in a pure pitch response.  In the event of 
stabilator damage or failure, however, there will be additional lateral coupling.  The 
RCLAWS will add lateral command as necessary to produce a pure pitch response, 
within the capability of the degraded system.  When inactive, the RCLAWS module 
passes the pilot’s commands directly to the Slim Control Laws. 
The RCLAWS module is comprised of three separate components that work in 
combination to provide the reconfiguration (Ward and Monaco, 2005).  The first 
component is a state space reference model that defines the desired aircraft motion in 
response to pilot control inputs.  High fidelity simulation data was utilized to generate 
low-order equivalent system transfer functions that yielded pitch and roll rate response to 
a control input.  The hardware implementation of the reference model in the FSFCCs 
allows for an 80Hz update, which is the same update rate as the standard FCCs 
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Figure 7: FTFCS Display 
 
Source: NAWCAD PAX-99-192-RTR, F/A-18 Fleet Support Flight Control Computer 
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Figure 8: Command Fade Between 701E and 1750A 
 
Source: NAWCAD PAX-99-192-RTR, F/A-18 Fleet Support Flight Control Computer 





The second component is a state space representation of the aircraft’s actual flight 
dynamics.  Onboard aircraft variables such as angular rate information, angle of attack 
(AOA), and stick positions are utilized in this algorithm.  Due to limitations of the 
FSFCCs the aircraft dynamics model is updated at a rate of 5Hz.  The low update rate 
when compared to the reference model and the FCC commands will be discussed in 
chapter 5, simulation results.  
The final component of the RCLAWS module is the receding horizon optimal 
controller used to determine the appropriate gain scheduling for reconfiguration.  This 
controller is the utilized to determine the appropriate increments to the control stick 
inputs for the reference model to match the aircraft dynamics model for a given control 
stick input.  The gain scheduling is implemented at 10Hz in the flight test hardware. 
In addition to affecting pilot stick outputs, the RCLAWS has the capability to 
regulate uncommanded yaw motion by adding increments about a zero pedal command. 
Because of the computational limitations of the research flight hardware, namely 
processor capabilities of the 1750A research processor, the pedal reconfiguration is not 
included in this derivation of the reconfigurable control laws, but is instead implemented 
as a fixed-gain regulator about a zero reference. This is capable in an aircraft such as the 
F/A-18C due to the fact that rudder pedal inputs during flight are typically associated 
with extremely dynamic maneuvering vice navigational maneuvering.  The stick only 
RCLAWS configuration and the stick/pedal configuration were tested extensively during 
simulation testing; those simulation results are discussed in chapter 5.  The decision to 
incorporate a stick only RCLAWS configuration and the rudder pedal modification is 
discussed during flight test results, chapter 7, and the conclusions and recommendations, 
chapter 9. 
SLIM CONTROL LAWS 
The Slim Control Laws are a functional duplicate of the inner loop of the 
production v10.1 control laws.  The 1750A processor’s resources, however, are 
extremely limited, and it cannot host both the entire v10.1 OFP and the RCLAWS.  To 
get around this limitation, engineers at Barron Associates, Inc. and Boeing, St. Louis, 
have rewritten the inner loop control laws as the “slim control laws” (Meloney and 
Doyle, 2005).  Because the 701E is continuously calculating many of the FCC internal 
variables in parallel with the 1750A, the requirement for the 1750A to calculate the same 
parameters has been eliminated.  Instead of independently calculating all of the internal 
variables, the 1750A receives many of them over the DPRAM from the 701E, effectively 
sharing the workload.  In addition, the outer loop control laws are not replicated in the 
slim control laws, and therefore functions such as speed brake compensation and 
autopilot are not supported.  The Slim Control Law module is always active when the 
1750A processor is engaged. 
FAILURE SIM MODULE 
The Failure Sim module takes outputs from the Slim Control Laws module and 
passes them back to the 701E processor’s output signal selection logic.  When active, the 
Failure Sim module fails a selected control surface by overriding the Slim Control Laws’ 
command with a command to a fixed position at a rate not greater than 8 degrees/second.  
The “failure” is introduced at least 2 seconds after the FSFCC is engaged.  The control 
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surface and the position to which the surface is commanded are determined by which 
FSFCC table and row numbers have been chosen by the pilot through the DAF interface.  
When inactive, the Failure Sim module passes the Slim Control Laws output directly to 
the 701E processor’s output signal selection logic. 
FSFCC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
TABLE/ROW NUMBER SELECTION, ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT 
FSFCC row and table numbers are specified to modify parameters, set modules as 
active or inactive, and set disengage limits for the FSFCC.  FSFCC table/row number 
combinations are specified by selecting a series of DAF table/row numbers.  The MC 
sends the values stored in the selected DAF table/row to the FSFCC, and the FSFCC 
converts these values to an FSFCC table/row number combination.  To operate the DAF, 
the FTFCS display must be enabled on the DDI (Figure 7).  With the FTFCS display 
enabled, push tiles 2 through 5 are labeled D through A, respectively.  The pilot specifies 
an FSFCC table/row combination by pressing a sequence of buttons B through D.  Table 
B-1 specifies valid sequences and describes the function of each.  
When the pilot depresses these three buttons (B, C, and D) in a sequence, the 
values of the corresponding table/row numbers will be sent to the FSFCC, and the 
FSFCC will store the sequence until a value of 1 (button A) is received. Upon receiving a 
1, the FSFCC will convert the previous values (four to six of them) to the corresponding 
FSFCC table/row combination.  If the table/row combination is found to be valid for 
arming, the ARM cue will be displayed on the FTFCS display.  The ARM cue will not be 
displayed if the FSFCC table/row modifies an internal parameter.  In the event of a 
parameter modification, the pilot will receive no feedback after pressing button A, but the 
engineers in the ground station will be able to verify that the correct parameter has been 
changed to the correct value.  In addition, the pilot has no indication of the correct 
sequence is being entered.  The pilot shall confirm with the ground station that the code 
corresponding to the correct table and row numbers has been entered prior to arming the 
1750A processor. 
When the pilot selects a valid, armable code and presses the “A” button, the 
1750A processor will arm, and the selected code will only be visible on the FSFCC 
display at RTPS.  Engagement of the FSFCC can be initiated by depressing the NWS 
button. When engaged, a “1 2 3 4” symbol will be displayed on the FTFCS display in 
place of the ARM cue, shown in Figure 7
The FSFCC may be disengaged at any time by depressing the paddle switch.  The 
system may also automatically disengage when either an automatic disengage limit is 
reached or an engagement requirement is no longer satisfied. This results in an FCS 
caution displayed on the DDI, a Master Caution indication, and an audible tone in the 
pilot’s headset.  
701E ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC  
A top level block diagram of the arm, engage, and disengage logic for FSFCC is 
presented in Figure 9. The first step in this process is to make an arm request. The pilot 
initiates this by depressing the DAF “A” button to initiate a valid, armable sequence. The 
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Figure 9: Top Level Arm/Engage/Disengage Block Diagram 
 
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable 
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
 
 
1750A is successfully armed, a pilot engage request can be made using the NWS button. 
Again, the 1750A monitors the NWS button and sends an engage request to the 701E. A 
pilot disarm or disengage request can be made at any time via the paddle switch, which is 
monitored by the 701E. Automatic disarm or disengage can be triggered by 701E 
monitoring of arm or engage criteria. In addition, the 1750A may set a disarm or 
disengage discrete, which results in reversion to the 701E processor. 
In order to engage the FSFCC, selected Envelope Criteria and System Status 
Criteria must be met.  Envelope Criteria for FSFCC engagement is defined for the 
parameters shown in Table B-1.  System Status Criteria is defined in Table B-2.  FSFCC 
engage limits for each Envelope Criteria parameter can be selected with the appropriate 
sequence in Table B-3. 
Any or all Envelope Engage Criteria parameters may be disabled either prior to or 
in flight. Once disabled, those parameters will not cause the 1750A to disengage until the 
Envelope Engage Criteria is explicitly re-enabled by the pilot.  In addition, each 
Envelope Engage Criterion has predefined, selectable upper and lower limits.  The intent 
of the automatic disengage is to serve as an additional safety measure.  The automatic 
disengage limits are intended to keep the aircraft from entering potentially unsafe parts of 
the flight envelope; they are not intended to prevent the aircraft from unintentionally 
entering otherwise safe parts of the envelope. 
FSFCC/RCLAWS OPERATING MODES 
As previously described, there are three separate modules within the FSFCC.  The 
RCLAWS module and the Failure Simulation (sim) module can each be active 
independently; the Slim Control Laws module is always active.  The active/inactive 
options of the three modules create four unique modes that can be engaged within the 
FSFCC.  Each mode is selected by following the DAF procedure described above. The 
DAF entries are converted within the FSFCC to a table and row number pair and then 





and the table and row numbers used in the FSFCC is presented in Table 1.  Each mode 
will be evaluated as described in simulation test planning, chapter 4.  A detailed summary 
of all valid table and row numbers along with a description of each mode selection is 
given in Table B-3 
 
Table 1: FSFCC Table and Row Numbers 
FSFCC Mode Module Status Table Number Row 
Number 
Basic Replication Mode  RCLAWS inactive 
Failure Sim inactive 
0 0 
Retrofit Control Mode RCLAWS active 
Failure Sim inactive 
21 0 
Basic Replication with 
Failures 
RCLAWS inactive 
Failure Sim active 
22 0 - 25 
Retrofit Control with 
Failures 
RCLAWS active 
Failure Sim active 
23 0 - 25 
 
Chapter 4: Simulation Test Planning 
OVERVIEW 
Simulation testing was broken down into two categories, software testing and 
hardware in the loop simulation (HILS).  The Non-Real-Time (software) testing utilized 
the Modular Six Degree of Freedom (ModSDF) analysis program located at Boeing 
Aircraft in St. Louis, Missouri, and the Controls Analysis and Simulation Test Loop 
Environment (CASTLE) program located at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland.  The 
software piloted simulations were conducted at the Boeing Simulation Facility in St. 
Louis, Missouri. The hardware in the loop testing was accomplished at the Manned Flight 
Simulator (MFS) complex at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland.  
TEST ENVELOPE 
Figure 10 presents the test envelope and test point conditions that were flown.  In 
addition to the test points shown, a test point at 10,000 feet and 1.20 Mach number was 
evaluated during the NRT and piloted software simulations.  Further discussion of the 
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Figure 10: NRT Simulation, Piloted Simulation and HILS Test Envelope 
 
Source: Monaco, J., Ward, D., and Bateman, A., “A Retrofit Architecture for Model-
Based Adaptive Flight Control,” AIAA 2004-6281, AIAA 1  Intelligent Systems 








Test points were performed in the following configurations: 1) Cruise (CR), 
defined as landing gear and flaps up; 2) Powered Approach (PA), defined as landing gear 
down and flaps full; 3) PA1/2, defined as gear down and flaps half; and 4) Simulated 
Single Engine (SSE), defined as gear down, flaps half and one throttle at flight idle.  
During the testing, the test team recommended that the speed brakes remain retracted 
whenever the 1750A processor was engaged because the slimmed control laws did not 
include speed brake compensation.   
NRT SIMULATION METHOD OF TEST 
NRT test maneuvers consisted of straight and level flight, throttle steps, doublets 
(all axes), loaded rolls, cross control inputs and general flying qualities.  Failure 
simulations included single and multiple control surface failures.  For CASTLE 
simulations, all ten control surfaces on the F/A-18C were considered in various test 
scenarios as shown in Figure 11.  Figure A-4 sets forth the particular CASTLE test matrix 
used during the testing.  The simulation results will be discussed in chapter 5. 
PILOTED SIMULATION AND HILS METHOD OF TEST 
The test points consisted of pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank-to-bank 
rolls, heading captures, and tracking tasks at each test condition.  Pitch doublets, pitch 
attitude captures, bank-to-bank rolls and heading captures were combined into an 
Integrated Test Set (ITS).  In addition, the pilots performed an in-flight refueling task 
during the manned software simulation. Heading captures were performed at the test 
team’s discretion, because early simulator results indicated that little value was added by 
performing these maneuvers.  Simulated wave offs were performed in lieu of the tracking 
task at 16,000 feet to assess PA handling qualities.  The complete test matrices and 
DMOT are presented in Table B-4 and appendix 4, respectively.  Each test point was 
performed in each of the following FSFCC modes: 
 
1. FSFCC engaged without RCLAWS and without simulated 
failure.  This mode provided baseline Handling Quality Ratings (HQRs) 
for the replicated portion of the F/A-18C control laws running on the 
1750A research processor.  
2. FSFCC engaged with RCLAWS and without simulated failure.  
The results of this test were compared to those from the preceding mode to 
ensure the validity of the aircraft model in the RCLAWS module, and to 
ensure non-interfering (zero) inputs without a failure. 
3. FSFCC engaged without RCLAWS and with simulated failure.  
This mode provided information on how the aircraft handles after a 
failure, but without the advantages of flight control reconfiguration. After 
the failure engaged, the pilot attempted to trim the rates to zero before 
maneuvering.  The pilot repeated this point for each of the several 











Figure 11: NRT Simulation and Piloted Simulation Control Surface Failures 
 
Source:Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report, 
March 2006.
 
4. FSFCC engaged with RCLAWS and with simulated failure.  
This test showed the benefits of the reconfiguration technique.  The pilot 
also repeated this mode for multiple different failure scenarios. 
The left stabilator, left aileron and left rudder , as shown in Figure 11, were failed 
for various maneuvers during the piloted software simulation.  For HILS and flight test 
points that include simulated failures, the test team commanded one of two surfaces (right 
stabilator or right aileron, as shown in Figure 12) to a fixed position.  The rational behind 
choosing failures on different sides of the aircraft during testing was to demonstrate 
RCLAWS flexibility.  For simulated stabilator failures, the FSFCCs commanded the 
surface to a fixed position within a range of ±6 degrees about the 1g trim position.  For 
simulated aileron failures, the FSFCCs fixed the surface within a range from 25 degrees 
trailing edge up (TEU) to 42 degrees trailing edge down (TED), not to exceed ±30 
degrees from the 1g trimmed position prior to FSFCC engagement.  For a simulated 
rudder failure, the FSFCCs commanded the surface to a fixed position of ±4 degrees 
(UA), or ±30 degrees (PA) about the 1g trim position. 
The pilots flew test points in the order of increasing risk.  PA configuration events 
were tested before those in SSE.  Pilots also completed ITSs before other test points for a 
given configuration.  Test points followed the build up in FSFCC modes, following the 
order presented in the preceding paragraph.  When the Failure Sim Module was active, 
simulated failures were built up in severity: aileron failures were simulated first, followed 




Figure 12: HILS and Flight Test Control Surface Failures 
 
Source:Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report, 
March 2006.
 
failures were tested prior to aileron failures.  The reason for the two different approaches 
was that with an aileron failure in the PA configuration, the ailerons are normally in a 
drooped position.  The drooped position, coupled with a zero degree aileron failure would 
allow for very little roll contribution in the positive direction for the functional aileron.  







Chapter 5: Simulation Test Results 
SOFTWARE TESTING RESULTS 
The software testing proved invaluable in the development and implementation of 
the final version of the retrofit system utilized for the HILS and flight testing.  Numerous 
changes to the original design of the RCLAWS algorithms were made to allow 
integration into the 1750A research processor.  For example, the desired update rate for 
all retrofit control computations is 80 Hz.  However, the processor capacity restricts the 
update rates for aircraft model to 5 Hz and the control system gains to 10 Hz.  
Fortunately, software testing in the CASTLE simulator and the piloted simulations at the 
Boeing Simulation Facility allowed for full 80 Hz capability.  In addition, the software 
simulations allowed for use of an integrated stick and pedal retrofit algorithm instead of 
just a stick only architecture that was implemented for the HILS and flight test portions.  
Lastly, the software simulations allowed for use of sideslip as a variable in the dynamics 
model of the aircraft.  Unfortunately, the F/A-18C cannot easily compute sideslip on the 
aircraft for implementation into the retrofit algorithm.  Instead, the algorithm used yaw 
rates provided by the onboard rate gyros.  Simulation showed that for the flight test 
envelope, the exclusion of sideslip from the algorithm was not significant.  In addition, 
without flight test clearance requirements, the simulation test envelope was not restricted 
to the modified Class B envelope.  Testing was conducted at a wide range of dynamic 
pressures and altitudes to document the strengths and weaknesses of the in-line retrofit 
method. 
With these limitations removed, the test team was able to observe a more realistic 
implementation of the in-line method.  The bulk of the testing consisted of approximately 
1,800 test cases.  Test cases typically consisted of 13 single and multi-axis maneuvers 
with 23 failure modes at six different conditions.  Figure A-3 shows the scoring criteria 
utilized in the CASTLE simulations.  Figure A-4 and Figure A-5 show the CASTLE 
simulation results for two of the six flight conditions tested.  The six flight conditions are 
shown in Figure 10.  As shown in the figures, the CASTLE results are extremely positive.  
The results showed that, as expected, the potential of reconfiguration provided an 
improvement in flying qualities increased as airspeed increased.  This can be partly 
attributed to the increased control power associated with higher dynamic pressures.  In 
addition, with higher dynamic pressure points, the control surfaces are more faired when 
a failure is inserted, effectively allowing the operational control surface increased 
deflection in both directions to counter the undesired coupling. 
With the software piloted simulation, the pilots were asked to perform the 
maneuvers described in chapter 4 and the DMOT, appendix D, and then assign HQRs for 
with and without retrofit enabled.  The HQR scale is described in Figure A-1.  Two pilots 
were used for these tests.  Boeing’s chief test pilot at the time (Pilot A) and a Navy, fleet 
experienced F/A-18 test pilot (Pilot B) were the aircrew that performed the piloted 
simulation evaluation.  Overall, Pilot A and Pilot B rated the nominal F/A-18 as an HQR 
1 or 2 aircraft and an HQR 2 or 3 aircraft, respectively, dependent on task and flight 
environment.  With failure modes engaged and retrofit not engaged, both aircrew rated 
the flying qualities between HQR 5 and 7.  However, once the retrofit system was 
engaged, Pilot A assessed the handling qualities as an HQR 2, and Pilot B assessed an 
HQR of 2 to 3.   
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Figure A-2 shows the combined HQRs for both piloted simulation flights.  Figure 
13 and Figure 14 show the HQRs for all of Pilot B’s maneuvers.  During the in-flight 
refueling task, Pilot B commented “The elimination of the constant left stick input and 
the roll coupling were a sure improvement.  It was hard to see a degradation in tanking 
resulting from any yaw coupling that may have been present.” (Rouland, 2002) 
RUDDER PEDAL MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION 
Another item that was concentrated on during the CASTLE simulations was the 
effect of a stick and rudder reconfiguration system instead of a stick only reconfiguration 
system.  The 1750A research processor only contains 32 kilobytes of usable random 
access memory (RAM) for use by the RCLAWS module, the Slim Control Laws, and the 
Failure Simulation, see Figure 15.  Multiple test scenarios were conducted to investigate 
the implication of conducting the test with and without inclusion of the rudder into the 
reconfirmation algorithm.  Test results showed that although the inclusion of the rudder 
pedal made vast improvements during some test cases, it was less important in others.  
The cases where rudder pedal inputs were helpful were predominately outside the Class 
B envelope (high dynamic pressure).  For test points within the Class B envelope, only 
small directional deviations were observed.  Therefore, for flight test, which is required to 
be executed within the Class B envelope, the rudder pedal could be excluded from the 
retrofit reconfiguration implementation without adversely affecting the data quality 
significantly. 
In an attempt to control the small uncommanded yaw motion, an optional “rudder 
pedal modification” was designed.  The rudder pedal modification was implemented as a 
simple fixed gain proportional integral control law with a zero model reference.  This is 
possible because during the majority of the F/A-18C flight envelope, rudder pedals are 
not used for maneuvering.  While the pilot is not technically prevented from making 
pedal inputs with the retrofit rudder pedal modification command option enabled, the 
system will attempt to cancel any yaw motion caused by the pilot's input.  The 
consequence is that the yaw response will appear sluggish or unresponsive to pedal 
inputs.  The capability to insert pedal commands can be enabled or disabled by selecting 
the appropriate FSFCC table and row numbers (Table B-3). 
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP RESULTS 
The HILS test results were used to optimize the FSFCC implementation of the 
RCLAWS. In particular, HILS testing was used to: define the envelope limits for 
automatic reversion from the research to the production (701E) control laws, finalize the 
flight test instrumentation message data and display layout for ground monitoring, and 
tune the cost functions and gain schedules for the reconfigurable controller. Flight 
conditions and HQR tolerances (Table B-5) were defined by the pilots and engineers 
based on HILS experience. In addition, liberal use of the simulator helped to streamline 
the flight test program by identifying candidate maneuvers early in the program that were 
not interesting from the point of view of reconfiguration. Original candidate flight test 
maneuvers included heading captures and simulated single engine wave offs, but these 
maneuvers were eventually dropped because the handling qualities did not change 
significantly regardless of the failure scenario or whether the retrofit reconfigurable 
controller was active.  Lastly, the HILS simulator sessions increased test efficiency by  
 
 




Figure 14: Software Simulation Results, Retrofit Control, Pilot B, All Maneuvers 
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 





Figure 15: 1750A Research Processor Memory Available for RCLAWS 
 
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable 
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
 
allowing the aircrew and ground crew to practice the maneuver set up, the maneuver 
execution, and develop a logical flow for test points.  The author believes the extensive 
use of the HILS was extremely important in a research project with limited funding and 
should be incorporated into future test projects. 
During the MFS sessions, three aircrew from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 
(VX) 23 (one Navy (the author), and two Marine fleet F/A-18 pilots), performed the 
evaluation.  During the evaluation, it was noted that a standard aggressive pitch capture 
tended to produce undesirable handling qualities.  Post-flight analysis determined that the 
stick input rate was so aggressive that the slow update rate of the aircraft dynamics model 
(5 Hz) was inadequate for the standard maneuver.  It was determined that future HILS 
and flight test would incorporate a less aggressive pitch capture.  This was noted as 
compensation, however, it was also noted that a reduced maneuver would have likely not 
been required in a fully capable, production retrofit system without insufficient dynamic 
model update rates.  Qualitative results from the HILS sessions were remarkably similar 
to previous piloted simulations.  The results from all three aircrew average one to two 
HQRs better for the RCLAWS engaged test points.  A compilation of the test maneuvers 
and HQRs assigned by pilot C is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 for production CAS 




Figure 16: HILS Test Results for Production CAS, Pilot C, All Maneuvers 
 
 
Figure 17: HILS Test Results for Retrofit Control, Pilot C, All Maneuvers 
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 






Chapter 6: Flight Test Planning 
OVERVIEW 
The primary objective of this testing was to gather flight test data, both 
quantitative and qualitative, to validate simulation results and support the further 
development of the RCLAWS.  The secondary objective of this testing was to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the RCLAWS to control the aircraft with a degraded FCS.  Initially, 
the operating budget allowed for three flights to perform the in flight evaluation of the 
RCLAWS.  A fortunate reduction in flight hours costs for the chase aircraft allowed for a 
fourth flight. 
TEST ENVELOPE 
The FSFCC was engaged within the modified NASA-designated Class B 
envelope shown in Figure 18 (12,000 feet to 33,000 feet, less than 250 KCAS).  If the 
limits of the modified Class B envelope were exceeded, the FSFCC 1750A processor 
would automatically disengage, as described in chapter 3. By limiting flight to this 
envelope, the risk of structural damage to the aircraft was significantly reduced in the 
event that an error in the FSFCC software commanded a control surface to full deflection.  
In deriving the test envelope, NASA used normal load factor transients as a metric to 
define the boundaries in a simulator (Carter and Stephenson, 1999).  With the automatic 
disengage Nz threshold set at 4g, multiple control surfaces were failed hard-over at a 
number of different flight conditions, and the 1750A was expected to disengage the 
system prior to the aircraft exceeding the 6g normal acceleration operational limit of the 
test aircraft.  For any flight condition that exceeded the load-factor transient limit, the 
point was considered outside of the Class B envelope.  In addition, a specialized Ada 
software load for laboratory testing was developed and executed.  This special Ada 
software load simulated worst-case scenarios, commanding multiple control surfaces to 
their limits instantaneously.  These scenarios were tested throughout the NASA Class B 
envelope and provided additional confirmation that the FSFCCs could be safely flown 
within the NASA Class B envelope. 
The low dynamic pressures maintained the relatively low aircraft energy state 
necessary to ensure minimum structural risk to the aircraft if a major computer 
malfunction were to occur.  There was no lower limit to dynamic pressure.  The lower 
altitude limit of the original NASA Class B envelope was 15,000 feet and was chosen to 
allow sufficient altitude for recovery from potential out-of-control flight.  For this test, 
the lower altitude limit was decreased to 12,000 feet to allow reasonable aircraft response 
in the Power Approach (PA) configuration while still providing sufficient altitude for 
recovery from any unexpected out-of-control flight.  The resulting envelope is referred to 
as the modified Class B envelope. 
Due to limited capacity of the 1750A research processor, the flight dynamics 
model to which the RCLAWS compare the actual aircraft response was tuned to two 
predefined flight conditions, designated by the gray diamonds in Figure 18.  The two 
points defined in this software allowed Cruise (CR) Flying Qualities (FQ) to be tested at 
20,000 feet / 235 KCAS, and PA FQ to be tested at 16,000 feet / 8.1 degrees AOA. 
 
































Figure 18: Flight Test Envelope 
 
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable 
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
FLIGHT CLEARANCE ISSUES 
Testing at NAS Patuxent River is generally performed to support fleet 
requirements and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) acquisition programs.  The 
culture and processes in place are tailored to this type of work. As a result, extra planning 
and extensive coordination was required for this flight test research program.  In addition, 
the budget restrictions of a research program created a need for thorough planning to 
maximize the efficiency of data gathering. 
A major cost driver of flight testing flight control systems can be the verification 
and validation of flight critical software. This was one of the primary advantages of using 
the FSFCC: the research software can only be engaged in a limited part of the envelope, 
and this can greatly reduce the software testing burden. While the retrofit system was 
subjected to extensive hardware-in-the-loop testing, module level testing of the research 
software was not performed. The primary safety of flight risk mitigation was to conduct 
the flight tests at altitude in a low dynamic pressure part of the envelope. 
With this envelope restriction as the primary risk-mitigation, it was possible to 
coordinate agreement on a flight clearance, written in such a way that the research 
software could be substantially modified between flights without requiring a new flight 
clearance.  In its place, an FSFCC software modification process was developed that 
required a greatly reduced approval chain for changes made within certain bounds.  This 
allowed reduced down time and the associated costs.  This was a significant departure 
from the normal NAVAIR procedure that would normally require a new clearance for 
each new software configuration.  It is the author’s experience that this departure was 
unprecedented and vital to the success of this program.  The extensive coordination and 





The NAVAIR flight clearance process, in this case, was very cooperative with the test 
team in allowing them to utilize their expertise to provide a safe test environment.  The 
author believes this cooperation between the test team and the flight clearance team 
should be adopted for future projects to allow for more cost and time efficient test 
programs.  
Another significant flight clearance issue was the fact that V10.1 is no longer the 
current F/A-18A/B/C/D FCC software version.  Version 10.5.1 (v10.5.1) contains 
substantial improvements, particularly in the areas of redundancy management and high 
angle-of-attack performance.  While flying with v10.l was still acceptable, it does present 
an increased risk over flight with v10.5.1.  In order to mitigate the risk, the pertinent 
differences between v10.5.1 and v10.1 were briefed before every flight with special 
attention to changes in emergency procedures.  For example, AOA probes failures during 
take-off in v10.1 are not sufficiently incorporated into the failure logic, and presented one 
of the greatest risks in reverting to v10.1 software.  To mitigate this risk, AOA probes 
were double checked prior to flight and monitored for failure during take-off.  In 
addition, pilots were required to perform at least one takeoff in the simulator with a failed 
AOA probe prior to being scheduled for a test flight.  A full list of differences between 
v10.1 and v10.5.1 is included in appendix C.  
TEST CONFIGURATION AND LOADOUT 
Flight test was conducted in the loadout defined as: clean configuration with a 
single centerline.  Therefore, no pylons were loaded on under wing stations (stations 2, 3, 
7, and 8), missile well covers were installed on the fuselage stations (stations 4 and 6) and 
empty LAU-7s were loaded on the wingtips (stations 1 and 9).  The only store loaded was 
a 330 gallon external fuel tank on the centerline station (station 6).   
Test points were performed in the following configurations: Cruise (CR) defined 
as landing gear and flaps up and Powered Approach (PA) defined as landing gear down 
and flaps full.  Because the slimmed control laws did not include speed brake 
compensation, it was recommended that speed brakes remain retracted whenever the 
1750A processor was engaged.   
METHOD OF TEST 
The method of test was identical to the method utilized at the HILS sessions with 
the learning points incorporated.  Two test maneuvers were removed from the flight 
cards: heading capture and SSE.  Buildup in FSFCC modes was again followed (e.g., 
baseline prior to RCLAWS, no failure prior to failure).   
INSTRUMENTATION AND REAL TIME MONITORING 
Data were collected using the onboard instrumentation system, which was a 
Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS).  The DDAS is a time division multiplex data 
acquisition system featuring programmable format definition and modular remote 
multiplexing units.  Analog and digital signals were encoded and inserted into an 
unencrypted Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) data stream for onboard recording and 
telemetry down link.  The PCM data stream included embedded Inter-Range 
Instrumentation Group (IRIG-B) time code for data synchronization with aircraft and 
cockpit voice recording system (CVRS) data.   
31 
  
The PCM data stream and analog pilot’s voice were transmitted to the ground 
station via the aircraft telemetry system. The telemetry transmitter provided 10 watts of 
output power and had a frequency range between 1435.5 and 1535.5 MHz. The 
transmitter frequency was selectable from the cockpit. 
REAL TIME DATA REQUIREMENTS 
Selected parameters were monitored real time to ensure test mission safety, as 
well as to verify satisfactory test point completion.  The Real-Time Telemetry Processing 
Station (RTPS) ground station was used for in-flight telemetry monitoring.  The basic 
RTPS project engineer station is comprised of ten strip chart recorders (8 channels/chart), 
two digital displays (16 parameters/display), seven color monitors, one user-interactive 
station with graphics displays, and various hardcopy units. 
The initial required telemetry setup included pilot’s voice, IRIG-B range time, 
and safety of test parameters (e.g., Nz, AOA, sideslip, etc).  Strip chart data were used to 
select areas for post-flight data reduction.  On board recorded parameters were used for 
quantitative data analysis post flight. 
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Chapter 7: Flight Test Results 
 
OVERVIEW 
Four test flights were made in two aircraft with two pilots at NAS Patuxent River 
in 2005 and 2006.  Both aircraft were F/A-18C models, had similar instrumentation 
systems, and were equivalent for the purposes of this test.  The same maneuvers were 
flown during the flight testing as were flown in the HILS sessions except for heading 
capture and the SSE evaluation.  Pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank angle 
captures, and target tracking were performed in CR, and pitch doublets, pitch attitude 
captures, and bank angle captures were performed in PA.  The same FSFCC modes and 
failure combinations that were performed in the simulator were also tested in flight.  The 
first three flights were flown by Pilot D (the author), a United States Navy fleet 
experienced F/A-18 test pilot, and the last flight was flown by Pilot E, a United States 
Marine Corps fleet experienced F/A-18 test pilot.  The test matrix was completed during 
the first three flights, and the fourth flight was used to revisit the most revealing test 
points with a second pilot for a different perspective.  Both pilots had flown similar test 
points in the simulator prior to their flights, and both pilots started their first flight with a 
comparison of FSFCC modes 1 and 2 (RCLAWS both inactive and active without 
failures, respectively). 
All four flights proceeded as expected, with the exception of three cases of 
unanticipated aircraft response.  Of these three cases, the first and third occurred during 
test maneuvers, and the second occurred during the second flight when the aircraft was 
configured in PA with RCLAWS engaged. 
UNANTICIPATED AIRCRAFT RESPONSE 
During the first flight, uncommanded yaw oscillations were noted during the 
vertical portion of a guns tracking maneuver with the right aileron failed at 0 degrees 
from trim.  The pilot discontinued the tracking task momentarily, but after the oscillation 
ceased, was comfortable enough to reacquire the target and continue tracking.  In-flight 
analysis suspected and post-flight data analysis confirmed that the aircraft temporarily 
dropped below the airspeed tolerance, and this had caused higher-than-anticipated flight 
control gains.  As described in chapter 6, the RCLAWS module was optimized about 
only two points in the modified Class B envelope.  The solution for the remaining flights 
was to remain within the tolerances, and to have the test conductor make reminder 
airspeed calls to the aircrew as necessary during the guns tracking maneuver. 
In the PA configuration during the second flight, the test team noted a high 
frequency, small amplitude oscillation in the retrofit increment to the lateral stick 
command.  The magnitude of the oscillation was small enough that the pilot perceived no 
lateral motion.  That flight was executed with FSFCC version 3.1.7 software, which 
allowed the pilot to select from nominal, 75%, or 125% reconfigurable control gains for 
all axes in flight.  Nominal gains were used for the entirety of the first and second flights.  
After the second flight, however, the FSFCC software was modified to version 3.2.7, 
which used the nominal pitch gains, but enabled the pilot to select diminished 
reconfigurable control gains for the roll axis (60% of nominal). 
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During the fourth flight, a small amplitude, low frequency roll oscillation was 
noted during smooth pitch attitude captures for the 0 degree aileron failure with the 
retrofit system engaged at the PA flight condition.  The point was re-tested after having 
the pilot select a reduced roll gain (60% of nominal).  The oscillation was lessened, but 
not eliminated.  Post-flight data analysis revealed that these roll oscillations were likely 
due to the simplified gain schedules employed. 
OVERALL HANDLING QUALITIES RESULTS 
Table 2 and Table 3 give flight test HQRs for pilots D in CR and PA 
configurations, respectively. Table 4 gives the flight test HQRs for Pilot E.  In these 
tables, commas separate ratings from different executions of the same test point, and 
ratings enclosed in brackets were flown with the optional rudder pedal modification off. 
Table B-5 describes the maneuvers and tolerances used to define desired and adequate 
performance for HQRs, and Figure A-1 is the standard Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities 
Rating scale used for HQRs given in this program.  Figure 19 and Figure 20 are graphical 
depictions of the combined pilot D and pilot E HQRs for production CAS and RCLAWS, 
respectively. 
As mentioned earlier, there were two maneuvers that involved unanticipated 
aircraft motion.  These maneuvers resulted in worse HQRs with the RCLAWS engaged 
than with the RCLAWS disengaged.  Additionally, there are three other cases for which 
the HQR is worse with the RCLAWS engaged.  The first case occurred during the 
vertical portion of the fine target tracking maneuver with the 6 degree stabilator failure at 
the CR flight condition, the pilot noted some undesired yaw response.  The second case 
occurred during the 0 degree right aileron failure in the PA configuration, the pilot noted 
a hesitation as the aircraft rolled through wings level during the aggressive bank-to-bank 
roll.  Post-flight data analysis indicated that both problems were due to the lack of 
integrated yaw control in the retrofit design.  In particular the hesitation through wings 
level for the PA point was linked to an interaction of the RCLAWS with the optional 
rudder pedal modification.  Though the same problem was not noted on the next test 
point, a 0 degree failure of the right stabilator, the test team decided not to use the rudder 
pedal modification for the remainder of the test program.  A production reconfigurable 
control system would be designed for full reconfiguration in all three axes, and would 
therefore not suffer this same interaction problem. 
The final case with a worse HQR for the RCLAWS engaged was the aggressive 
pitch capture for the 30 degree aileron failure in CR for Pilot E.  Even though a worse 
HQR (HQR 4 versus HQR 3) was given for the RCLAWS-engaged case, pilot comments 
during the test maneuvers indicated that the handling qualities were better with the 
retrofit system. Immediately after finishing the integrated test set, the pilot was asked for 
his overall impression.  He stated that the aircraft was much more controllable with the 
retrofit system.  He went on to state he “would consider the overall handling qualities of 
the aircraft with the 30 degree aileron failure and the RCLAWS active to be HQR 3 to 4 
whereas the handling qualities for the same failure without the RCLAWS would be HQR 
5 to 6.” (Kelly, 2006) 
 
 
Table 2: CR Flight Test HQRs for Pilot D 
  Flight 1 Flight 1 Flight 1 Flight 1 
No Failures Aileron = 0 deg Aileron = +15 deg Stab = 0 deg CR Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit
Smooth 2 2 2 2 5 4 4 3 Pitch Capture 
Aggressive 2 2 2 2 5 4 4 3 
Smooth 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 Bank to Bank 
Aggressive 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Coarse 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 Target Tracking Level 
Turns Fine 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 
Coarse 2 2 3 5 5 4 4 3 Target Tracking 
Maneuvering  Fine 2 2 3 DND 5 4 4 3 
      
  Flight 2 Flight 2 Flight 3  
No Failures Aileron = 0 deg Aileron = +15 deg  CR Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit   
Smooth 5 3 3 3 3 [3]   Pitch Capture 
Aggressive 6 3 3 3 5 [3]   
Smooth 4 3 3 3 3 [3]   Bank to Bank 
Aggressive 4 3 3 3 3 [3]   
Coarse 5 4, [3] 3 3 3 [3]   Target Tracking Level 
Turns Fine 5 4, [3] 3 3 3 [3]   
Coarse 5 5, [4] 3 3 3 [3]   Target Tracking 







Table 3: PA Flight Test HQR’s for Pilot D 
  Flight 2 & 3 Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 3 
No Failures Aileron = 0 deg Aileron = -15 deg Aileron -30 deg PA Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit 
Smooth 2, 3 2 3 2 3 [3] 3 [3] Pitch Capture 
Aggressive 2, 3 2 3 3 3 [3] 3 [3] 
Smooth 2, 3 2 4 4 3 [3] 3 [3] Bank to Bank 
Aggressive 2, 3 2 4 5 3 [3] 3 [3] 
      
  Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 3  
Stab = 0 deg Stab = -3 deg Stab = -6 deg  CR Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit   
Smooth 3 3 3 [3] 4 [3]   Pitch Capture 
Aggressive 3 3 5 [3] 4 [3]   
Smooth 3 3 4 [3] 3 [3]   Bank to Bank 







Table 4: Flight Test HQRs for Pilot E 
  Flight 4 Flight 4  
No Failures Aileron = +30 deg  CR Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit   
Smooth 2 - 2 [2]   Pitch 
Capture Aggressive 3 - 3 [4]   
Smooth 2 - 4 [3]   Bank to 
Bank Aggressive 3 - 4 [3]   
Coarse 2 - 4 [4]   Target 
Tracking 
Level Turns 
Fine 2 - 4 [4]   
Coarse 2 - 5 [4]   Target 
Tracking 
Maneuvering 
Fine 2 - 5 [4]   
     
  Flight 4 Flight 4 Flight 4 
No Failures Aileron = 0 deg Stab = -6 deg PA Flight Condition 
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit 
Smooth 2 - 3 [4] 2 [3] Pitch 
Capture Aggressive 2 - 4 [4] 3 [3] 
Smooth 2 - 4 - 4 [3] Bank to 
Bank Aggressive 2 - 5 - 5 [3] 





Figure 20: Flight Test Results for Retrofit Control, Pilots D & E, All Maneuvers 
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 






Twelve individual comparisons of the RCLAWS to the baseline (non-retrofit) 
system were made for the no failure case.  In each of these comparisons, the pilot noted 
no difference in the aircraft response.  This is verified by the identical HQRs and gives 
evidence that the retrofit system does not affect the baseline response if the vehicle is 
behaving nominally (i.e., not interfering).   
The performance with the RCLAWS engaged is better than the baseline system 
for 35 out of the 85 individual comparisons with a simulated surface failure.  The 
baseline system is rated better than the RCLAWS in only 5 cases with a simulated failure.  
All but one of these cases is attributed to compromises in the retrofit design due to 
limitations in the flight hardware.  For the final case, pilot comments indicated that, 
despite receiving a worse rating, the RCLAWS-engaged performance was preferred. 
Of the 45 failure cases for which the RCLAWS and baseline system were given 
equal ratings, only four of them were worse than HQR 3 (all HQR 4).  This is partly due 
to the fact that only small magnitude failures were tested as part of the build up approach 
and partly due to the robustness of the F/A-18C platform and the baseline control laws.  
Therefore, there was little room for the RCLAWS to improve upon the performance of 
the baseline system for many of the failure scenarios tested within the limited scope of 
the flight test plan and test envelope. 
Even with the F/A-18’s robust design, the HQRs averaged 0.5 points better with 
the RCLAWS engaged during a failure than they did without.  The mean HQR for 
RCLAWS-engaged failure points is approximately 3 with a standard deviation of 0.6, and 
the mean HQR for all RCLAWS-disengaged failure points is approximately 3.5 with a 
standard deviation of 0.9.  While the mean values may appear to be very close, an 
examination of the data reveals a definite improvement in performance with the retrofit 
system.  This improvement is evidenced by the fact that, with simulated failures active, 
there are twice as many HQR 2 test points for the retrofit system as for the baseline 
system (12 test points versus 6 test points) and significantly fewer HQR 5 ratings for the 
retrofit system versus the non-retrofit system (2 test points versus 15 test points). 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Not only did the HQRs show an improvement with the RCLAWS active, the 
quantitative data showed a significant reduction in the coupling as a result of control stick 
input.  Figure 21 shows the flight test data from a +15 degree right aileron failure in the 
CR configuration without RCLAWS active.  Figure 22 shows the data from the same 
failure configuration with RCLAWS active. 
The data presented show a pitch doublet performed multiple times in succession.  
In Figure 21 without RCLAWS, there is significant roll coupling to a roughly pure pitch 
doublet (denoted with arrows).  Conversely with RCLAWS active, in Figure 22, the roll 
coupling is significant reduced.  In this example, the coupling was approximately 3 times 
less with RCLAWS active than production CAS alone.  This reduction was also evident 
in the relative HQRs assigned by the pilot.  The CAS alone event received an HQR of 5, 
while the RCLAWS event received an HQR of 4, again a 1 point improvement with the 
reconfigurable flight controls. 
 
 
Figure 21: Production CAS, +15 degree aileron failure, Pitch Doublets 
 
 
Figure 22: RCLAWS, +15 degree aileron failure, Pitch Doublets 
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and 






ADDITIONAL RCLAWS CONTRIBUTION TO THE F/A-18C 
Pilot feedback indicates that for a platform as robust as the F/A-18C, the greatest 
advantage of the RCLAWS is realized at the onset of the failure.  While a modest 
improvement in handling qualities was seen during post-failure maneuvering, the author 
believes the greatest benefit is the system’s ability to immediately recognize a departure 
of aircraft motion from that commanded, and to apply control inputs to compensate.  
Without RCLAWS engaged, the pilot was sometimes surprised by the magnitude of the 
motion resulting from an inserted failure, even though the failure was expected. The pilot 
often spent a significant amount of time reacquiring straight and level flight and trimming 
the aircraft to zero rates (if zero rates were within the trim capability of the failed 
system).  With RCLAWS engaged, however, failure insertion was often transparent to the 
pilot, and any change in aircraft dynamics was only noticed upon maneuvering.  The 
almost indistinguishable insertion of the failures will be very beneficial in the real world 
application, chapter 8.   
This was also noticed in the simulator during the single engine exercises.  
Although the rudder pedal contributions were due to the rudder pedal modification vice 
reconfigurable control, there was no appreciable directional or lateral component to 
corrections for power additions with RCLAWS active vice a significant requirement 
without RCLAWS.  This would be even more dramatic of a difference in a non-centerline 




Chapter 8: F/A-18C Real World Fleet Applications 
OVERVIEW 
In the past two years, there have been three United States Navy Class A mishaps 
involving out of control flight associated with flight control effector failures in the F/A-
18.  The United States Navy defines a Class A mishap as any mishap that causes more 
than $1 million damage or causes the loss of life.  In two of the three incidents the F/A-18 
was destroyed at a cost of over $30 million to the government.  In the remaining mishap, 
the F/A-18 was destroyed and a United States Navy pilot also lost his life.  All three of 
these incidents have been partially caused by the mechanical failure of the inboard 
leading edge flap.  In the first two incidents, the pilot lost control at the onset of the 
failure and it was never fully regained.  In the most recent incident, the pilot did not loose 
control until the aircraft slowed for transition to a landing configuration.  Based upon the 
circumstances of the third incident and the simulations conducted since the incident, this 
author contends that the aircraft involved in the mishaps remained flyable, not 
withstanding the major flight control effector failure.  Nevertheless, the mishaps were 
virtually unavoidable because the pilot could not always learn to control the new aircraft 
in the short time available prior to loss of control. 
LEF FAILURE BACKGROUND 
As denoted in the aircraft description in chapter 3, the LEFs are full span in the 
F/A-18C.  The LEFs are separated, however, into two parts at the wing fold joint.  These 
parts are commonly referred to as the inboard LEF and the outboard LEF.  Although the 
inboard and outboard sections of the LEF appear as though they are not physically tied to 
one another, they are mechanized to operate as a pair and schedule in unison.   
Over the 28 year history of the F/A-18 flying in the United States Navy inventory, 
there have been 14 documented cases of LEF failures.  Four of these cases have involved 
inboard LEF failures (all of which led to a mishap) and the remaining 10 cases have 
involved outboard LEF failures (all of which landed successfully).  Outboard LEF 
failures are considerably more benign than the inboard LEF failures due in part to their 
respective sizes and location relative to the remainder of the wing surface.  The inboard 
LEF is approximately twice as large as the outboard LEF.  Engineers suspect that the 
outboard LEF failure has been caused by an asymmetry control unit failure that allows 
the outboard LEF to reach its structural limit of 55 degrees LEU.  Flight characteristics of 
the failure show that a moderate roll off into the direction of the failure can be easily 
countered with lateral stick and trim.  In several cases, the outboard LEF has even 
departed the aircraft due to air loads, resulting in no significant adverse handling 
qualities. 
The first inboard LEF failure occurred during developmental testing of the F/A-18 
at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland in 1982.  Fortunately, the pilot survived and was 
therefore able to describe not only the failure, but also the aircraft’s reduced flying 
qualities.  Engineers determined that the failure was caused by a failed hydraulic drive 
unit (HDU) spline.  As a result of this failure, engineers changed the LEF drive 
mechanization (HDU spline) to incorporate a brake mechanism that froze the LEF at 
approximately 4 degrees LEU.  This device, referred to as the torque limiter, successfully 
prevented additional inboard LEF failures for 22 years in United States Navy F/A-18C 
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aircraft.  In 2002, however, an F/A-18C flying under normal operating conditions 
experienced an inboard LEF failure that resulted in the loss of the aircraft.  Similarly, 
twice in early 2006, two F/A-18 aircraft and one pilot were lost due to a failed inboard 
LEF.  An engineering investigation is currently underway to determine the root cause of 
these mishaps.  Regardless of the exact cause of the failure, the air loads will drive the 
failed control surface to approximately 55 degrees LEU which results in adverse handling 
qualities and the possibility of out of control fight. 
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND OUT OF CONTROL FLIGHT 
In the 2004 and first 2006 mishaps, the aircraft initially departed controlled flight 
with an abrupt roll in the direction of the failure.  The pilot momentarily regained control, 
but then lost it again with a highly coupled departure and never regained controlled flight.  
The most recent mishap, however, the aircrew recovered the plane to an upright attitude 
and flew almost 100 miles prior to departing controlled flight.  The most recent mishap 
demonstrated that, although the aircraft was in a failure state, the highly redundant flight 
control system allowed the aircraft to transit a considerable distance.  In the end, 
however, the aircraft and pilot succumbed to new dynamics and departed controlled 
flight.   
An investigation began to determine why the aircraft was controllable in some 
conditions and was uncontrollable in others.  A group of aircrew from VX-23 at NAS 
Patuxent River, Maryland and several flying qualities and flight controls engineers sought 
to recreate the scenario in the MFS facility in order to develop a technique that allowed 
aircrew to either fly and land the plane, or that at least allowed them additional time to 
reach a location more conducive to rescue.  Replicating the failed surface in the MFS was 
not as easy a task as first thought.  The aerodynamic models used to simulate the flying 
qualities of the aircraft were not thought to exist for such a dramatic failure.  Developing 
those models would have been time intensive and very difficult.  Fortunately, NASA 
possessed the required aerodynamic models and allowed the United States Navy to use 
them in the analysis.  NASA developed these aerodynamic failure models for use with 
their Active Aeroelastic Wing (AAW) program flown on the F/A-18.  With these flying 
qualities models in place in the high fidelity simulators at MFS, the engineers and aircrew 
were able to recreate the scenarios and determine a possible reason for the immediate loss 
of control in two cases, yet the ability to continue flight for a period of time in the third 
case. 
During the MFS sessions, the team observed that the aircraft was flying at greater 
than 300 KCAS when the LEF failed in all three cases.  Upon failure, the aircraft began a 
rapid roll into the direction of the failed surface.  The roll rate was controllable with 
lateral control inputs.  In all three of the recent cases, the aircraft was able to return to 
upright, mostly straight and level flight.  In two of the three cases, however, the aircraft 
began to slow down.  At approximately 275 to 300 KCAS, the aircraft departed 
controlled flight and the pilot was unable to regain control.  The simulation at MFS 
showed these exact traits.  Upon further investigation and diagnosis of the flight control 
position relative to the control stick position, the team observed that the aircrew needed a 
cross controlled input to maintain a wings level attitude and a constant heading when the 
aircraft slowed below 300 KCAS.  The team concluded that lateral stick was required 
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opposite the failed wing flap to oppose roll off, and that a rudder input in the direction of 
the failure was required to prevent a constant skidded turn opposite the failure.   
Most F/A-18 pilots would agree that the Hornet has a superior ability to maneuver 
in all portions of the envelope.  This maneuverability is due in large part to the extremely 
complex flight control system that determines the correct flight control position for a 
commanded stick and rudder input.  The flight controls surfaces are very autonomous in 
the F/A-18.  For example, both the LEF and TEF schedule automatically with changing 
airspeed and AOA.  In addition, a rolling surface to rudder interconnect (RSRI) provides 
for turn coordination automatically.  In the case of a failed LEF, however, the otherwise 
extremely helpful flight control system contributed to the departures.  As mentioned 
above, the aircrew had to command a cross controlled input to maintain straight and level 
flight.  If the RSRI is functioning, the FCCs interpret any lateral stick input as a 
commanded turn.  The commanded lateral stick automatically commanded rudder 
deflection into the direction of turn for coordination.  This commanded lateral stick 
adversely affected the flying qualities in two ways.  First, without actually being in a turn, 
that needs rudder for coordination, the commanded rudder is suspected to increase 
sideslip away from the failure, contributing to the flat turn that builds as airspeed 
decreases.  Second, the RSRI commanded rudder reduced the amount of rudder 
deflection available to the aircrew to prevent sideslip buildup.   
The auto scheduling flaps compound the problem of the RSRI.  As one can 
imagine, if a large obstruction is placed on the leading edge of a wing, it no longer 
efficiently creates lift.  The obstruction, however, would create a large amount of 
parasitic drag.  This rapid reduction of lift and increase in parasitic drag on the failed side 
has been identified as the possible cause for the rapid roll into the direction of the failure.  
As the airspeed decreases on a standard wing, the coefficient of lift is typically 
decreasing along with the induced drag.  However, in the case of the F/A-18C wing, the 
flaps are scheduling to maintain the lift with slowing airspeed. This results in an 
increasing coefficient of lift and corresponding induced drag on the non-failure side.  
Conversely, on the failed side, as airspeed decreases, even though there is a large, non-
aerodynamic surface impeding airflow, the parasitic drag decreases.  As airspeed 
continues to drop and the functional LEF is scheduled as commanded (as described in 
chapter 2, the TEFs are frozen with a LEF failure in CR), the induced drag eventually 
overcomes both the parasitic drag on the failed wing and the rudder authority of the pilot 
which has been reduced due to the RSRI.  The author has concluded that this combination 
results in a classic adverse yaw departure and aircraft control was lost.  In two of the 
three cases, after control is lost, the outstanding flight control system and departure 
recovery logic resident in the F/A-18 allowed the aircrew to briefly regain control of the 
aircraft in a nose low attitude.  Once the pilot attempted recovery, however, AOA 
increased and the flaps again began to auto-schedule, which lead to a re-departure similar 
to the first.   
The solution devised through extensive simulation was to disable all of the 
“helpful” modes of the F/A-18.  The team realized that there was sufficient control power 
to offset the parasitic drag induced by the failed LEF, as long as the aircraft stayed above 
approximately 300 KCAS.  The new procedure dictated that the pilot maintain 300 
KCAS or more (not to exceed 350 KCAS) until the aircraft was switched to a back-up 
mode, which removed flap scheduling and reduced the gains associated with the RSRI.  
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This back-up mode is referred to as “gain override.”  This mode tells the FCCs to 
configure the aircraft for set, known conditions regardless the aircraft’s actual conditions.  
For example, if gain override is selected with the flaps up, the jet configures the aircraft 
for flight at 35,000 feet, 0.7 Mach number and 2 degrees AOA.  In simulation, gain 
override mode allowed the pilot to reconfigure the aircraft to permit a safe landing.  The 
author and numerous other F/A-18 test pilots attempted flights without performing the 
gain override procedures without success.  In each attempt with gain override, however, 
although the workload was considerable both at onset and throughout the remainder of 
the flight, a safe controllable landing was made.  As a result of the simulation testing, the 
gain override procedures were incorporated in the emergency procedures for a LEF 
failure and distributed to the F/A-18 community to prevent future loss of life.   
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL 
SIMULATION PLANNING 
The RCLAWS program had already begun testing when the two most recent 
F/A-18 LEF mishaps occurred.  Many questions were raised regarding how the 
capabilities of the RCLAWS architecture would handle the LEF failures.  Unfortunately, 
such a determination was outside the scope of the RCALWS test plan.  In light of this 
limitation, the author set out to determine the effectiveness of the RCLAWS in-line 
method of reconfiguration and whether or not it would prevent the loss of aircraft and 
aircrew after the completion of the RCLAWS test program.  Once the MFS sessions 
determined the cause of the departures, several engineers concluded that the RCLAWS 
in-line method would not be able to maintain aircraft control.  Many thought, the 
utilization of the gain override modes of the FCCs would prevent RCLAWS from 
maintaining control.  Nevertheless, the author still endeavored to demonstrate the 
system’s response in the simulated environment. 
The MFS facility would have been the ideal environment to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the RCLAWS against this failure with HILS.  Unfortunately, two 
circumstances prevented use of the MFS facility for the HILS.  First, was the requirement 
for the failure mode had to be resident in the failure module of the RCLAWS architecture 
as written in the FSFCCs.  Adding this failure to logic already resident in the software 
would have required extensive software modifications and was outside the scope of this 
thesis.  Second and more importantly, as previously discussed, the RCLAWS, as 
implemented on the FSFCCs, are optimized around two airspeeds only (235 KCAS in CR 
and 8.1 AOA in PA) due to the limited computation space in the 1750A processor.  
Adequate determination of the feasibility of the RCLAWS to maintain control over the 
envelope from failure insertion at a tactical airspeed to a simulated landing was outside 
the capability of the FSFCCs.  In addition, as implemented in the FSFCCs, the 701E will 
not allow the 1750A to arm if gain override has been selected.  These factors therefore 
prevented use of the MFS facility to determine RCLAWS effectiveness against a LEF 
failure. 
Software simulation, however, could provide a means to test RCLAWS response 
to the catastrophic LEF failure.  During the early CASTLE simulations, the test team 
investigated a LEF failure for a hard over failure in both directions (LEU and LED).  
However, the LEU failure was limited to 4 degrees LEU, since engineering analysis 
believed that 4 degrees LEU was the failure mode of that control surface.  During these 
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tests, the RCLAWS provided improved or unchanged handling qualities throughout the 
envelope as shown in Figure A-4 and Figure A-5.  Once again, the problem of 
programming the CASTLE simulator to simulate the desired failure was not without 
difficulty.  The NASA derived aerodynamic models were coded in a different version of 
CASTLE.  Once the software engineers had completed the transformation, the failure was 
loaded into the CASTLE simulator.   
Despite the obvious disadvantage of not being able to perform the simulation at 
the MFS facility due to FSFCC restrictions, there were several advantages to performing 
this test in the CASTLE simulator.  First, the CASTLE simulations enabled the test team 
to observe the effect of RCLAWS in a larger operational environment, instead of seeing 
the effect at only one or two predefined points.  In addition, the CASTLE simulator is not 
resource limited like the 1750A processor on the FSFCCs, and it can incorporate rudder 
commands into the reconfiguration algorithm.  This incorporation allows for a more 
powerful reconfiguration system.  As discussed in chapter 4, there is also the added 
advantage of incorporating beta feedback into the dynamics module to provide a better 
reconfiguration response from RCLAWS.  Lastly, the CASTLE simulation allows use of 
reconfigurable flight control with or without gain override selected.   
Although there were numerous advantages to the CASTLE simulation, the limited 
budget for this testing required that tradeoff in the implementation of the RCLAWS 
algorithm.  As set forth in chapter 4, the engineers optimized the CASTLE simulator 
around seven flight conditions during the simulation test planning.  The two flight 
conditions most similar to the failure flight profile to a landing were the 20,000 feet, 0.7 
Mach and the 20,000 feet, 0.3 Mach number.  Although it would have been ideal to 
utilize a larger envelope, budget constraints required performance of the evaluation 
between these predefined points.  Fortunately, the simulator logic utilizes a linear 
algorithm that allowed a smooth transition to the closest predefined test condition.  
Therefore, while performing the deceleration from approximately 325 KCAS to a landing 
speed of approximately 190 KCAS, the RCLAWS used a combination of the two known 
conditions to interpolate the correct dynamic response.  Although this interpolation 
limited the accuracy of the results, the author contends that these particular test cases and 
the associated results were comparable to the outcome with a perfect dynamic model of 
the entire envelope.  Finally, unlike the previous flight and HILS results, that this 
simulation utilized FCS OFP Version 10.5.1 (v10.5.1) instead of v10.1 utilized in the 
FSFCCs. 
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL 
SIMULATION SESSION 
During the simulation events, the author endeavored to prove that reconfigurable 
flight control would provide a better aircraft response than the gain override technique to 
allow for a transit and landing.  The simulation tested four different scenarios.  The first 
case simulated the baseline v10.5.1 aircraft without the benefit of RCLAWS to confirm 
that CASTLE simulation response was similar to both the MFS data and the mishap data.  
The second case incorporated an all axis reconfigurable algorithm.  This algorithm 
utilized not only the rudders, but also integrated beta feedback into the RCLAWS 
computations for higher fidelity.  The third case utilized the RCLAWS control laws, but 
in this case the RSRI, thought to contribute to the departures, was disabled.  This case 
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attempted to isolate the cause of the departure between the auto scheduling flaps and the 
RSRI.  The final configuration involved RCLAWS with gain override selected.  The 
author tested this scenario to determine if RCLAWS required the use of gain override to 
perform the required task of transit and a simulated landing.  The author also repeated the 
final case utilizing trim to increase control authority.   
The author tested all four scenarios with a fleet representative loadout and gross 
weight.  The loadout flown included three drop tanks, two 1,000 pound bombs and four 
air to air missiles.  The fuel state for these tests was approximately 10,000 pounds.  It 
should be noted, that during MFS sessions in order to get to a speed in which a safe 
landing could be made, all external stores had to be jettisoned and fuel load adjusted to 
approximately 3,000 pounds.  In order to more accurately demonstrate an average pilot’s 
response to the failure and as dictated in the NATOPS manual, the pilot delayed stores 
jettison until reaching approximately 245 KCAS and transitioning to a landing 
configuration.  The author utilized the same stores jettison criteria for the CASTLE 
simulations.  In all cases, the right LEF was failed to full deflection LEU (approximately 
55 degrees) between 325 and 335 KCAS. 
During the baseline case, the aircraft responded similarly to both the mishap 
events and the MFS sessions with a sharp roll off in the direction of the failure.  The 
author countered the roll with left lateral stick and regained level flight with 
approximately 2 inches of lateral stick (3 inches is maximum lateral stick deflection).  As 
the aircraft began to slow, the lateral stick increased to full.  Slowing below 
approximately 280 KCAS, the author slowly applied right rudder to stop an 
approximately 2 degree/second yaw rate.  With previous failure experience and prior 
knowledge of the failure flight characteristics, the author was able to achieve 
approximately 260 KCAS prior to reaching an unrecoverable departure.  At the point of 
departure, the pilot had applied full lateral stick and full rudder.  These results were 
comparable to the previous MFS sessions and flight mishap data, however, the author 
was able to get to a slightly slower airspeed after applying multiple practices with LEF 
failures. 
For the second case with the benefits of RCLAWS, the author expected a much 
lower controllable airspeed prior to departure.  At the onset of the failure, the aircraft 
rolled right approximately 5 degrees and then returned to level flight with no aircrew 
action.  The only failure indications to the pilot were the FCS caution and status page 
indicating a failed LEF, an aural tone in the headset and the Master Caution.  At 
approximately 300 KCAS, an ITS was performed with extremely positive results (HQR 
4).  The only notable deviation from a nominal aircraft during the ITS was a slight yaw 
coupling with a pure pitch input.  Slowing the aircraft proved to be a much easier task 
without having to fight the roll off with almost full lateral stick.  RCLAWS commands to 
the FCCs were comparable to the first case.  As the aircraft slowed, a slight left yaw rate 
developed that was easily countered with slight opposite pedal (approximately 20 
pounds).  From 250 KCAS to 235 KCAS, the retrofit input to the FCCs was commanding 
within 1/2 inch of full lateral stick.  After slowing to approximately 235 KCAS (below 
normal jettison airspeed), however, the aircraft departed flight and was unrecoverable.  
Although the aircraft departed, it was able to attain a slower speed with a considerably 
reduced workload.  Post departure, the RCLAWS continued to supplement the pilot 
commands even though the author had released the controls in accordance with published 
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procedures and desired to allow the FCCs to utilize the outstanding departure recovery 
logic to recover the aircraft.  This simulation case demonstrated the benefits of in-line 
reconfiguration in the case of an inboard LEF failure, but also demonstrated a case where 
the RCLAWS was not non-interfering with the desired aircraft response. 
The third case proved to be the most informative for purposes of comparison to 
the MFS sessions.  This third simulation also utilized RCLAWS, however the RSRI was 
disabled to isolate the LEF scheduling.  Again the failure was inserted at approximately 
325 KCAS and a slight roll off occurred that corrected itself to level flight with no pilot 
input.  As the aircraft began to slow, a slight (2 degree/second) right yaw rate developed.  
At approximately 300 KCAS the aircraft departed to the right or into the failure.  As the 
pitch attitude increased nose low and airspeed increased above approximately 320 KCAS, 
however, the pilot regained aircraft control.  A second attempt to slow the aircraft again 
resulted in a departure.  Analysis of the RCLAWS input indicated that the RCLAWS 
were commanding full lateral stick at the departure with no corresponding rudder input.  
It is interesting to note, however, that the departure was so abrupt and unexpected that the 
aircrew could not counter it with full the application of rudder.  This case demonstrated 
that no single factor was the cause of the departures.  From the MFS sessions, the 
consensus was that the departures were partially caused by the RSRI reducing the rudder 
authority available to oppose sideslip.  This simulation showed, however, that without 
RSRI, the pilots could not slow the aircraft below approximately 300 KCAS.  Therefore, 
it is the author’s conclusion that although the RSRI may be a contributing factor to the 
eventual departure of the aircraft below approximately 250 KCAS, without RSRI, the 
aircraft is uncontrollable below 300 KCAS.  In addition to the frozen flap scheduling 
commands provided by the gain override mode, the largest contribution to the increased 
controllability with gain override selected is the reduced, but not eliminated, gains of the 
RSRI system. 
The final case simulated the RCLAWS engaged with gain override selected.  As 
described earlier, this mode freezes the flap scheduling and reduces the RSRI control 
gains.  Again, at the onset of the failure, the aircraft rolled slightly but then corrected 
without pilot interaction.  During the deceleration from 325 KCAS, the pilot performed 
ITSs approximately every 10 KCAS.  Again, a slight directional coupling was detected 
with pitch inputs.  In addition, the author also noted the roll rate to the left was slightly 
less than the roll rate to the right during the bank to bank rolls.  Analysis showed that 
during the left rolls, the pilot inputs together with the RCLAWS contributions 
commanded the stick full deflection to the left.  This full stick deflection caused the lower 
roll rates when in a left roll.  Nevertheless, the reduced roll rates were adequate to transit 
and land.  Slowing the aircraft to 250 KCAS required no action from the pilot except 
throttle modulation.  Below 250 KCAS, a slight left yaw rate developed that was easily 
countered with a small application of rudder pedal (approximately 20 pounds).  In the 
end, the pilot slowed the aircraft to approximately 13 degrees AOA (215 KCAS) in the 
landing configuration, without having to jettison the external stores.  Although 215 
KCAS is still above an approved landing speed, this performance demonstrated the 
capabilities of the RCLAWS module in combination with gain override. 
After noting the reduced roll rate during the fourth simulation run and recalling 
that the failure condition could be countered with trim during MFS sessions, the author 
sought to investigate the effects of trimming out the failure.  As described in chapter 3, 
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the RCLAWS modify the pilot inputs to achieve the desired response.  The FCCs, 
however, have the added capability to effectively deflect flight controls through the use 
of the lateral trim.  After inserting the failure, the pilot trimmed left lateral stick so that 
the RCLAWS module was producing zero command.  The pilot repeated the same ITSs 
at 300 KCAS.  This time, the roll rate was approximately equal in both directions.  Again, 
the pilot was able to slow the aircraft to 215 KCAS with stores loaded with no adverse 
qualities. 
INBOARD LEF FAILURES WITH RCLAWS RESULTS 
The goal of the simulation testing was to provide the pilot with a better aircraft 
response to the failure than the current gain override method.  The second simulation 
demonstrated that the RCLAWS alone effectively allowed the aircrew to slow the aircraft 
to approximately 235 KCAS, airspeed well within the jettison envelope of these stores 
that conforms with standard controllability check practices.  In addition, RCLAWS 
allowed the aircrew to slow the aircraft by an additional 10 KCAS in comparison to the 
non-retrofit approach.  A stores jettison at approximately 250 KCAS and a subsequent 
simulated landing established that this configuration was indeed a successful 
implementation of the RCLAWS to prevent the loss of aircraft and life.   
Although the simulation was successful, from approximately 250 KCAS down to 
235 KCAS, the RCLAWS module was commanding within approximately 1/2 inch of 
full lateral deflection.  This deflection left the aircrew not only with little 
maneuverability, but also on the verge of an uncontrollable departure.  Once the pilot 
jettisoned the stores and adjusted the gross weight, the RCLAWS flew an approach 
similar to a trimmed out non-retrofit approach.   
Although the second simulation demonstrated the effectiveness of RCLAWS to 
allow the pilot to achieve a typical jettison envelope without the use of gain override, the 
author learned two additional lessons from this simulation.  The first lesson reinforced 
earlier testing results.  The author contends that the greatest benefit of RCLAWS occurs 
at the onset of the failure.  Instead of the aircraft violently departing with a snap roll in 
the direction of the failure, the aircraft rolled slightly into the failed wing yet returned to 
level flight within 10 seconds with no aircrew input.  This aircraft response to failures 
could significantly benefit the aircrew for several reasons.  When an aircraft emergency 
appears, especially when compounded by an unanticipated aircraft response, the pilot’s 
typical first reaction is to retard the throttles and assess the situation.  Unfortunately, in 
the case of the “smart” flight controls on the F/A-18, slowing the aircraft led to a larger 
problem due to the auto scheduling flaps and RSRI.  With RCLAWS, the aircraft does 
not depart with the onset of the LEF failure which allows the aircrew to calmly assess the 
situation and determine the proper course of action. 
Closely related to the almost transparent failure insertion, is the reduction in trim 
requirements with the RCLAWS.  This again allows the aircrew to concentrate on 
diagnosing the situation and developing a plan.  In addition, for some aircrew that 
typically pilot fly by wire aircraft, trimming the aircraft is almost foreign.  It was noted 
that during the MFS sessions, almost one-half of the pilots did not trim out the almost full 
lateral stick deflection until reminded of that option.  For example, during a typical F/A-
18 sortie, the author only trims the aircraft if there is a large asymmetric loadout, or for 
landing.  Aircraft with such complex flight control systems rarely require pilot trim to 
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attain the desired flight condition.  The RCLAWS rapid identification and response to 
failure onsets is the most enhancing feature of this reconfigurable flight control system. 
The second significant lesson learned occurred during the third and fourth 
simulations.  The rapid departure that occurred at 300 KCAS during the third simulation 
was very unexpected for two reasons.  First, the author had flown this failure 
approximately fifteen times in the simulated environment.  During those simulations, the 
aircraft was controllable to below 300 KCAS, or if a departure was evident, sideslip 
would slowly build unlike the rapid, nose slice departure experienced with RSRI off.  
Second and more importantly with the other departures, the pilot had been holding flight 
control inputs in that would tell the pilot when a full control deflection was being 
reached.  In the case of RCLAWS, because the pilot has the stick centered for straight 
and level flight and the RCLAWS module is commanding a lateral stick deflection to 
oppose the roll off the pilot has no sense of an impending limitation to the control 
authority.   
This realization led to the second significant finding from the simulations.  
Human factors are integral to this system’s successful incorporation into a production 
aircraft.  In a failure situation, the aircrew will need to know the outputs of the RCLAWS 
to the FCCs.  Whether it is simply a stick and rudder plot that is displayed on the DDI 
when a failure is present, or a numerical output that shows commanded lateral or 
longitudinal stick deflection, a display is necessary to communicate to the pilot that 
available control authority is approaching a limit.  The final simulation case also 
demonstrated the importance of human factors.  As stated above, the use of trim allowed 
for increased control authority and improved handling qualities.  The direction or 
magnitude of trim required, however, is not always intuitive, especially for multiple 
failures.  A display for the aircrew, therefore will enable the pilot to reduce the RCLAWS 
commanded stick deflection with trim and increase the effective control authority. 
Lastly, the second simulation case showed that although the RCLAWS are 
designed to be non-interfering, an out of control flight scenario is currently outside the 
capabilities of the algorithm.  F/A-18 out of control flight procedures dictate that controls 
are neutralized and no rudder inputs are commanded.  However, post departure, the 
RCLAWS algorithm interpreted the centered control stick and no rudder inputs as 
straight and level flight when the aircraft was actually out of control.  The RCLAWS then 
commanded rudder inputs to oppose the buildup in sideslip and lateral and longitudinal 
inputs to counter the pitch and roll oscillations associated with an F/A-18 that is out of 
control.  These commands prevented the production control laws from achieving a rapid 
recovery.  Further research is needed to prevent RCLAWS from interfering with aircraft 
control in regimes where aircraft dynamics are not sufficiently modeled. 
RECOMMENDED RCLAWS IMPLEMENTATION FOR LEF FAILURES 
Overall, the simulation showed that indeed, the RCLAWS provided a slight 
increase in the aircraft handling qualities and allowed the pilot to attain a slower airspeed 
prior to departing controlled flight.  This will allow an inexperienced or more likely, a 
task overloaded pilot, to concentrate on flying the aircraft with known control inputs 
instead of commanding almost full lateral stick just to maintain wings level.  The reduced 
workload will allow the aircrew a better likelihood of being able to fly and possibly 
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indicated by the control stick position with production control laws and RCLAWS, 
respectively.  In the figures, only the left lateral stick displacement is shown for clarity.  
From the figures, it can be concluded that the pilot in command of the RCLAWS aircraft 
had the benefits of reduced physical workload in the terms of both failure onset and 
follow on control stick inputs required to maintain level flight.  RCLAWS, even in the 
less powerful in-line configuration, provides a definite improvement over production 
control laws and should be incorporated into the F/A-18C to prevent future loss of 
aircraft. 
The final simulation with RCLAWS and gain override showed the most promise 
in terms of the slowest airspeed achieved without the jettison of ordnance and with the 
least perceived pilot workload.  Ideally, an RCLAWS algorithm integrated into the F/A-
18C could incorporate the use of gain override when necessary for aircraft control.  
Unfortunately, the gain override mechanization in the F/A-18C does not allow for 
selection of gain override throughout the entire flight envelope.  For example, if gain 
override is selected above approximately 350 KCAS, the aircraft begins a divergent pitch 
oscillation that can result in the loss of the aircraft.  There are still several possibilities to 
incorporate the advantages of gain override without endangering the aircraft and crew.  
The first is the incorporation a dynamic pressure or airspeed above which the RCLAWS 
is prohibited from utilizing gain override in its reconfiguration.  When the airspeed is 
below the threshold, the RCLAWS would automatically convert to gain override and 
display this to the pilot for inclusion in a decision regarding landing.  A second method is 
to simply allow the RCLAWS to transition to gain override only after the pilot selects 
gain override.  The author prefers this implementation because it allows the pilot to 
remain in the decision matrix on whether or not to select a different gain set.  In addition, 
it allows for a human to make the decision if it is safe to select the backup mode.  If an air 
data failure was present that masked the true airspeed of the aircraft, and gain override 




Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unfortunately the RCLAWS do not return a damaged flight control system to its 
original handling qualities.  For example, even with RCLAWS engaged, the handling 
qualities still averaged a full point lower on the HQR scale for the system with failures. 
These limitations are partially due to performing the reconfiguration through increments 
to the pilot commands, instead of the flight control surfaces directly.  In addition, testing 
at low dynamic pressure effectively limits the control power available to the in-line 
retrofit system.  Simulator testing outside of the modified Class B envelope indicates that 
the greatest advantage of the RCLAWS system over the baseline system is realized at 
higher Mach numbers with failures of larger magnitude.  Nevertheless, RCLAWS 
demonstrate both quantitative and qualitative improvements over the production system 
in the limited test envelope. 
RCLAWS’ greatest contribution to the aircrew was two-fold.  First, the 
reconfiguration algorithm allowed aircrew to pilot the plane in a manner to which they 
were accustomed.  The RCLAWS’ contributions from the comparison of the actual 
aircraft response and the desired aircraft response permitted familiar control inputs to 
result in familiar aircraft motion.  This alleviated the difficult task of learning an 
aircraft’s new dynamics after a flight control effector failure or aircraft damage.  Second, 
the RCLAWS’ expeditious response to unanticipated aircraft motion resulting from 
damage or failure significantly reduced both the workload and the accompanying 
emotional response of the aircrew.  Failures were almost transparent to the aircrew at 
insertion. 
The RCLAWS project also highlighted the importance of two planning factors 
that should be incorporated into future F/A-18C projects.  First, the test team’s interaction 
with the flight clearance process from the beginning of the project substantially 
contributed to the results achieved.  The test team realized from the start of this project 
that effective communication with, and education of, the flight clearance department and 
relentless cooperation between the two organizations was vital to the success of this 
program.  The author believes that this unprecedented involvement and coordination by 
both sides should be adapted for future projects.   
Second, the effective use of simulation prior to the flight test portion of the 
project also led to the success of this program.  The piloted software simulation allowed 
the team to develop control law changes in a cost effective environment, and to determine 
which flight control effector failures provided the best demonstration of RCLAWS 
strengths.  In addition, proactive use of HILS allowed testing of the actual flight hardware 
in a high fidelity simulation of the aircraft’s expected response.  The HILS testing not 
only allowed the aircrew to become familiar with the expected response, refine test 
maneuvers execution and practice emergency procedures, but also allowed the ground 
test team to build an efficient routine that would allow for increased success while 
airborne.  Although simulation and HILS have been used occasionally used during other 
test programs, this program demonstrated that research projects with a limited budget can 
gain additional experience and knowledge through more widespread use of simulation 
and HILS that allows for more efficient programs. 
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Lastly, the author’s investigation into an RCLAWS application to a real world 
fleet F/A-18C failure revealed that even an aircraft as robust as the F/A-18C can benefit 
from reconfigurable flight control technology.  Although the test team developed a 
technique that allowed the aircraft to recover without the aid of RCLAWS, simulation 
showed that with RCLAWS, the probability of a successful recovery rose dramatically 
due to the reduced workload and rapid response of the control laws to a failure.  As such, 
the author contends that incorporation of reconfigurable control law technology into the 
F/A-18C will save additional lives and aircraft in the future of this platform. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
ALL AXIS RECONFIGURABLE CONTROL 
Although there was considerable improvement in the handling qualities of the 
F/A-18C with RCLAWS active instead of inactive, as shown by the flight test results, the 
simulation results demonstrated that the three input reconfiguration algorithm (lateral and 
longitudinal stick and rudder) configuration was more capable than the stick only 
reconfiguration.  Even though the simulation established that the reduced benefits of the 
stick only configuration were acceptable within the Class B envelope, the deficiencies 
were still noticeable.  The rudder pedal modification compromise, although sometimes 
beneficial, had to be secured for half of the testing due to undesirable effects on handling 
qualities.  As shown in the both NRT simulation results and the real life application, the 
importance of the rudder pedal in the algorithm is significant when outside the Class B 
envelope.  Therefore, future testing should include the benefits of all axis reconfiguration.   
INCREASE TEST ENVELOPE 
The modified Class B envelope significantly helped to reduce the flight clearance 
issues and increase the overall safety margin afforded to this program.  Simulation and 
flight test results, however, demonstrated that increasing dynamic pressure resulted in 
increased control power and thus reconfiguration opportunities.  The flight tests with 
RCLAWS during this program showed that the software is stable and highly unlikely to 
command a flight control surface that would cause an aircraft overstress.  Future testing, 
even with FSFCCs, should be conducted in an expanded envelope to show the true 
capability of RCLAWS to recognize and react to a flight control failure. 
AIRCRAFT INCORPORATION 
Although the in-line method of reconfiguration is still in its infancy, there are 
many benefits that could be realized by its incorporation into any fly by wire aircraft.  
The in-line method, however, still requires verification and validation prior to production 
incorporation.  If this method proves to be easier to certify, installation into aircraft could 
yield positive results.  Even though the parallel method is more powerful, the in-line 
method could be a stepping stone that saves aircraft and lives in the near future.  The 
flight tests with minor failures, and subsequent simulation testing with an actual fleet 
representative failure that caused multiple mishaps, demonstrated this method’s potential 
on the highly redundant F/A-18.  Future application in both the military and the 
commercial sector of aviation could benefit greatly from application of the in-line 




Several programs in recent years have capitalized on the lessons learned in the 
Sioux City crash of United Airlines flight 232, and utilized thrust in the reconfiguration 
algorithm.  In 1995, an MD-11 landed safely despite sole control from differential and 
symmetric thrust from the engines (Tomayako, 2003).  Propulsive effects are another 
powerful tool that can be used for reconfiguration.  With the increasing use of full 
authority digital engine control (FADEC) in both civilian and military aviation, electrical 
control of the engine could lead to an even more powerful reconfiguration algorithm.  
The propulsive effects are slightly less on a fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18 because of 
the location of the engines relative to the center of gravity. Nevertheless, the engine 
effects are still beneficial and should be incorporated into future retrofit reconfigurable 
algorithms on fighter aircraft as demonstrated in the successful landing of the F-15 
ACTIVE aircraft under only propulsive affects.  Propulsive contributions are more 
substantial on a wide body aircraft such as the C-17 or most commercial passenger 
aircraft.  Unfortunately, this method would also likely result in greater certification 
requirements. 
FUTURE OF FSFCC TESTING 
The FSFCCs provided a relatively easy, cost effective method to test flight 
control software.  The flight critical nature of the remainder of the envelope required the 
use of these innovative devices.  Unfortunately, these FCCs were designed and built over 
seven years ago.  Vast improvements in technology have been made since then that 
should allow for increased capabilities in the memory capacity and thus functionality of 
the FSFCCs.  With a more capable system, the test team could have easily tested a larger 
portion of the envelope, even within the modified Class B envelope.  In addition, with a 
higher computing capacity, the FSFCCs should be able to incorporate all of the latest 
safety improvements that have been incorporated into FCS OFP v10.7.  Such 
incorporation would allow for increased safety while testing with the FSFCCs.  Lastly, an 
increase in processing capacity of the FSFCCs would allow for a stick and rudder 
algorithm that has proven to be more powerful over a wider range of conditions than the 
stick only algorithm.  Even without improvements, however, test teams should utilize the 
FSFCCs for future research projects, especially those with fiscal constraints or tight 
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Figure A-1 Cooper Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale 
 






Figure A-2: Combined Piloted Simulation HQRs 
 
Source: Monaco, J., Ward, D., and Bateman, A., “A Retrofit Architecture for Model-Based Adaptive Flight Control,” AIAA 2004-




Figure A-3: CASTLE Simulation Scoring Criteria 
 
Source: Ward, D., and Monaco, J., “System Identification for Retrofit Reconfigurable Control of an F/A-18,” Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 




Figure A-4: F/A-18 CASTLE Simulation results for NRT Transonic Test Point (30,000 feet and 0.9 Mach)  
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control 




Figure A-5: F/A-18 CASTLE Simulation results for NRT Class B Test Point (20,000 feet and 0.3 Mach) 
 
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control 
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Table B-1: Envelope Engage Limits 






PA Entry 1 5.0 -5.0 
PA Entry 2 10.0 -10.0 
PA Entry 3 15.0 -15.0 
Pitch Rate 
(degrees/sec) 
UA Entry 1 
UA Entry 2 
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PA Entry 2 
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Table B-1: continued 






PA Entry 1 10.0 5.0 
PA Entry 2 15.0 0.0 
PA Entry 3 20.0 -5.0 
Angle-of-Attack 
(degrees) 
UA Entry 1 
UA Entry 2 







PA Entry 1 
PA Entry 2 









UA Entry 1 
UA Entry 2 







PA Entry 1 
PA Entry 2 









UA Entry 1 
UA Entry 2 







PA Entry 1 45 -45 
PA Entry 2 60 -60 
PA Entry 3 90 -90 
Bank Angle 
(degrees) 
UA Entry 1 
UA Entry 2 







PA Entry 1 25000 10000 
PA Entry 2 30000 12000 
PA Entry 3 35000 15000 
UA Entry 1 25000 10000 
UA Entry 2 30000 12000 
Altitude 
(feet) 
UA Entry 3 35000 15000 
Notes: (1) Boldfaced parameters are engaged by default 
and will remain engaged throughout the test 
program. 
      (2) Boldfaced limits are defaults. 
 (3) Grayed-out entries are outside of other limits 
(NATOPS, Flight Clearance, modified Class B), 



















































AOA/Air Data Fail X X  
1750A No Go Indication X X  
Actuator Failure X X  
Dual Discrete Fail X X  
Quad Discrete Fail X X  
Quad Sensor Fail X X  
1750A Processor Failures X X  
Dual Port Ram Invalid X X  
MUX Bus Invalid X X  
DEL/MECH Mode Engaged X X  
Master Caution set by FCC X X  
Channel OFF X X  
RFCS Data Not Ready  X  
RFCS Command not Valid  X  
Manual SPIN Selected   X 
SPIN Mode   X 
Heading Hold Requested or Engaged   X 




Table B-3: FSFCC Version 3.1.6 Mode Selections 
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A 0 0 Slimmed F/A-18 Replication Mode 
    
CBBB 1 0 Pitch Rate Check Enabled 
CBBC 1 1 Pitch Rate Check Disabled 
CBBD 1 2 Reset Pitch Rate Parameters to Nominal Values 
CBCB 1 3 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBCC 1 4 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBCD 1 5 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBDB 1 6 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBDC 1 7 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBDD 1 8 Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
CCBB 1 9 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CCBC 1 10 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CCBD 1 11 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CCCB 1 12 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CCCC 1 13 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CCCD 1 14 Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
DBBB 2 0 Roll Rate Check Enabled 
DBBC 2 1 Roll Rate Check Disabled 
DBBD 2 2 Reset Roll Rate Parameters to Nominal Values 
DBCB 2 3 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DBCC 2 4 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DBCD 2 5 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DBDB 2 6 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DBDC 2 7 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DBDD 2 8 Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
DCBB 2 9 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DCBC 2 10 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DCBD 2 11 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DCCB 2 12 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DCCC 2 13 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DCCD 2 14 Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CBBBB 3 0 Yaw Rate Check Enabled 
CBBBC 3 1 Yaw Rate Check Disabled 
CBBBD 3 2 Reset Yaw Rate Parameters to Nominal Values 
CBBCB 3 3 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBBCC 3 4 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBBCD 3 5 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBBDB 3 6 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBBDC 3 7 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBBDD 3 8 Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
CBCBB 3 9 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBCBC 3 10 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
 
 









BCBD 3 11 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBCCB 3 12 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBCCC 3 13 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBCCD 3 14 Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CCBBB 4 0 Nz Check Enabled 
CCBBC 4 1 Nz Check Disabled 
CCBBD 4 2 Reset Nz Parameters to Nominal Values 
CCBCB 4 3 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CCBCC 4 4 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CCBCD 4 5 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CCBDB 4 6 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CCBDC 4 7 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CCBDD 4 8 Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
CCCBB 4 9 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CCCBC 4 10 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CCCBD 4 11 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CCCCB 4 12 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CCCCC 4 13 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CCCCD 4 14 Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CDBBB 5 0 Lateral Acceleration Check Enabled 
CDBBC 5 1 Lateral Acceleration Check Disabled 
CDBBD 5 2 Reset Lateral Acceleration Parameters to Nominal Values 
CDBCB 5 3 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 1 
CDBCC 5 4 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 2 
CDBCD 5 5 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 3 
CDBDB 5 6 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 
1 
CDBDC 5 7 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 
2 
CDBDD 5 8 Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 
3 
CDCBB 5 9 Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 1 
CDCBC 5 10 Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 2 
CDCBD 5 11 Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA 
Entry 3 
CDCCB 5 12 Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table PA 
Entry 1 













CDCCD 5 14 Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table PA 
Entry 3 
    
DBBBB 6 0 Angle-of-Attack Check Enabled 
DBBBC 6 1 Angle-of-Attack Check Disabled 
DBBBD 6 2 Reset Angle-of-Attack Parameters to Nominal Values 
DBBCB 6 3 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DBBCC 6 4 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DBBCD 6 5 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DBBDB 6 6 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DBBDC 6 7 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DBBDD 6 8 Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
DBCBB 6 9 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DBCBC 6 10 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DBCBD 6 11 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DBCCB 6 12 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DBCCC 6 13 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DBCCD 6 14 Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
DCBBB 7 0 Impact Pressure Check Enabled 
DCBBC 7 1 Impact Pressure Check Disabled 
DCBBD 7 2 Reset Impact Pressure Parameters to Nominal Values 
DCBCB 7 3 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DCBCC 7 4 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DCBCD 7 5 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DCBDB 7 6 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DCBDC 7 7 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DCBDD 7 8 Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
DCCBB 7 9 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DCCBC 7 10 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DCCBD 7 11 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DCCCB 7 12 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DCCCC 7 13 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DCCCD 7 14 Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
DDBBB 8 0 Static Pressure Check Enabled 
DDBBC 8 1 Static Pressure Check Disabled 
DDBBD 8 2 Reset Static Pressure Parameters to Nominal Values 
DDBCB 8 3 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DDBCC 8 4 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
DDBCD 8 5 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DDBDB 8 6 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DDBDC 8 7 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DDBDD 8 8 Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
DDCBB 8 9 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
DDCBC 8 10 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
 
 









DDCBD 8 11 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
DDCCB 8 12 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
DDCCC 8 13 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
DDCCD 8 14 Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CBBBBB 9 0 Bank Angle Check Enabled 
CBBBBC 9 1 Bank Angle Check Disabled 
CBBBBD 9 2 Reset Bank Angle Parameters to Nominal Values 
CBBBCB 9 3 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBBBCC 9 4 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBBBCD 9 5 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBBBDB 9 6 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBBBDC 9 7 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBBBDD 9 8 Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
CBBCBB 9 9 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBBCBC 9 10 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBBCBD 9 11 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBBCCB 9 12 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBBCCC 9 13 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBBCCD 9 14 Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CBCBBB 10 0 Altitude Check Enabled 
CBCBBC 10 1 Altitude Check Disabled 
CBCBBD 10 2 Reset Altitude Parameters to Nominal Values 
CBCBCB 10 3 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBCBCC 10 4 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBCBCD 10 5 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBCBDB 10 6 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBCBDC 10 7 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBCBDD 10 8 Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
CBCCBB 10 9 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1 
CBCCBC 10 10 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2 
CBCCBD 10 11 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3 
CBCCCB 10 12 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1 
CBCCCC 10 13 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2 
CBCCCD 10 14 Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3 
    
CCBBBB 12 0 Reset All Parameters to Nominal Values 
CCBBBC 12 1 Enable All Limit Checks 
CCBBBD 12 2 Disable All Limit Checks 
    
CCCBBB 13 0 Ground Test Mode  OFF 
CCCBBC 13 1 Ground Test Mode  ON  - Disable Envelope Checks 
CCCBBD 13 2 Ground Test Mode  ON   
    
 
 









 14-19  Not Used 
    
DBDBBB 20 0 Retrofit Gain Set No. 1 (Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),  
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0) 
DBDBBC 20 1 Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (4/3 x Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),  
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0) 
DBDBBD 20 2 Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (5/3 x Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),  
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0) 
DBDBDB 20 6 Retrofit Gain Set No. 1 (Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0), 
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1) 
DBDBDC 20 7 Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (4/3 x Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),  
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1) 
DBDBDD 20 8 Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (5/3 x Nominal),  
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0), 
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1) 
    
DCBBBC 21 1 Retrofit Control Only  
DCBBBD 21 2 Retrofit Control Stand Alone Test (Ground Test only) 
    
 22 0-12 FAIL R Stabilator  Absolute Failures (not used) 
    
DCCCCC 22 13 FAIL R Stabilator  0 deg Offset 
DCCCCD 22 14 FAIL R Stabilator  +1 deg Offset 
DCCCDB 22 15 FAIL R Stabilator  +2 deg Offset 
DCCCDC 22 16 FAIL R Stabilator  +3 deg Offset 
DCCCDD 22 17 FAIL R Stabilator  +4 deg Offset 
DCCDBB 22 18 FAIL R Stabilator  +5 deg Offset 
DCCDBC 22 19 FAIL R Stabilator  +6 deg Offset 
DCCDBD 22 20 FAIL R Stabilator  -1 deg Offset 
DCCDCB 22 21 FAIL R Stabilator  -2 deg Offset 
DCCDCC 22 22 FAIL R Stabilator  -3 deg Offset 
DCCDCD 22 23 FAIL R Stabilator  -4 deg Offset 
DCCDDB 22 24 FAIL R Stabilator  -5 deg Offset 
DCCDDC 22 25 FAIL R Stabilator  -6 deg Offset 
    
 23 0-12 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator Absolute Failures (not 
used) 
    
DCDCCC 23 13 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  0 deg Offset 
DCDCCD 23 14 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +1 deg Offset 
DCDCDB 23 15 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +2 deg Offset 
 
 









DCDCDC 23  16 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +3 deg Offset 
DCDCDD 23 17 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +4 deg Offset 
DCDDBB 23 18 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +5 deg Offset 
DCDDBC 23 19 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  +6 deg Offset 
DCDDBD 23 20 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -1 deg Offset 
DCDDCB 23 21 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -2 deg Offset 
DCDDCC 23 22 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -3 deg Offset 
DCDDCD 23 23 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -4 deg Offset 
DCDDDB 23 24 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -5 deg Offset 
DCDDDC 23 25 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Stabilator  -6 deg Offset 
    
 24 0-12 FAIL R Aileron  Absolute Failures (not used) 
    
DDBCCC 24 13 FAIL R Aileron  0 deg Offset 
DDBCCD 24 14 FAIL R Aileron  +5 deg Offset 
DDBCDB 24 15 FAIL R Aileron  +10 deg Offset 
DDBCDC 24 16 FAIL R Aileron  +15 deg Offset 
DDBCDD 24 17 FAIL R Aileron  +20 deg Offset 
DDBDBB 24 18 FAIL R Aileron  +25 deg Offset 
DDBDBC 24 19 FAIL R Aileron  +30 deg Offset 
DDBDBD 24 20 FAIL R Aileron  -5 deg Offset 
DDBDCB 24 21 FAIL R Aileron  -10 deg Offset 
DDBDCC 24 22 FAIL R Aileron  -15 deg Offset 
DDBDCD 24 23 FAIL R Aileron  -20 deg Offset 
DDBDDB 24 24 FAIL R Aileron  -25 deg Offset 
DDBDDC 24 25 FAIL R Aileron  -30 deg Offset 
    
 25 0-12 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron Absolute Failures (not used) 
    
DDCCCC 25 13 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  0 deg Offset 
DDCCCD 25 14 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +5 deg Offset 
DDCCDB 25 15 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +10 deg Offset 
DDCCDC 25 16 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +15 deg Offset 
DDCCDD 25 17 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +20 deg Offset 
DDCDBB 25 18 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +25 deg Offset 
DDCDBC 25 19 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  +30 deg Offset 
DDCDBD 25 20 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  -5 deg Offset 
DDCDCB 25 21 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  -10 deg Offset 
DDCDCC 25 22 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  -15 deg Offset 
DDCDCD 25 23 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  -20 deg Offset 
DDCDDB 25 24 Retrofit  -  FAIL R Aileron  -25 deg Offset 
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Table B-4:Detailed Test Matrix 












1100 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  None Inactive  
1101 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  None Active  
1110 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 0 deg Inactive  
1111 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 0 deg Active  
1120 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 15 deg Inactive  
1121 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 15 deg Active  
1130 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 30 deg Inactive  
1131 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 30 deg Active  
1140 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 0 deg Inactive  
1141 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 0 deg Active  
1150 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 3 deg Inactive  
1151 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 3 deg Active  
1160 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 6 deg Inactive  
1161 Integrated Test Set(1) CR 20,000 235  Stab, 6 deg Active  
1200 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  None Inactive  
1201 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  None Active  
1210 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 0 deg Inactive  
1211 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 0 deg Active  
1220 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 15 deg Inactive  
1221 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 15 deg Active  
1230 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 30 deg Inactive  
1231 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Aileron, 30 deg Active  
1240 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Stab, 0 deg Inactive  
1241 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Stab, 0 deg Active  
1250 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Stab, 3 deg Inactive  

















FSFCC Mode(2) Remarks 
1260 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Stab, 6 deg Inactive  
1261 Guns Tracking CR 20,000 235  Stab, 6 deg Active  
2100 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 None Inactive  
2101 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) None Active  
2110 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Inactive  
2111 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 0 deg Active  
2120 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Inactive  
2121 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 15 deg Active  
2130 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Inactive  
2131 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 30 deg Active  
2140 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Stab, 0 deg Inactive  
2141 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 0 deg Active  
2150 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Stab, 3 deg Inactive  
2151 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 3 deg Active  
2160 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Inactive  
2161 Integrated Test Set(1) PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 6 deg Active  
2200 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 None Inactive HILS only 
2201 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) None Active HILS only 
2210 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 
2211 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 0 deg Active HILS only 
2220 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Inactive HILS only 
2221 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 15 deg Active HILS only 
2230 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Inactive HILS only 
2231 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Aileron, 30 deg Active HILS only 
2240 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 Stab, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 
2241 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 0 deg Active HILS only 

















FSFCC Mode(2) Remarks 
2251 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 3 deg Active HILS only 
2260 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Inactive HILS only 
2261 Waveoff PA 16,000  8.1(3) Stab, 6 deg Active HILS only 
3100 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 None Inactive HILS only 
3101 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 None Active HILS only 
3110 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 
3111 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Active HILS only 
3120 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Inactive HILS only 
3121 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Active HILS only 
3130 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Inactive HILS only 
3131 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Active HILS only 
3140 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 
3141 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 0 deg Active HILS only 
3150 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 3 deg Inactive HILS only 
3151 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 3 deg Active HILS only 
3160 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Inactive HILS only 
3161 Integrated Test Set(1) PA1/2 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Active HILS only 
3200 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 None Inactive HILS only 
3201 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 None Active HILS only 
3210 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 
3211 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 0 deg Active HILS only 
3220 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Inactive HILS only 
3221 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 15 deg Active HILS only 
3230 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Inactive HILS only 
3231 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Aileron, 30 deg Active HILS only 
3240 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Stab, 0 deg Inactive HILS only 

















FSFCC Mode(2) Remarks 
3250 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Stab, 3 deg Inactive HILS only 
3251 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Stab, 3 deg Active HILS only 
3260 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Inactive HILS only 
3261 SSE Waveoff SSE 16,000  8.1 Stab, 6 deg Active HILS only 
NOTES: (1) Integrated Test Set consists of pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank-to-bank rolls, and optional heading captures.  
Specific procedures for each maneuver are described in the DMOT. 
 (2) The FSFCC 1750A research processor will be engaged for all test points.  The RCLAWS will be active where 
designated, and the Failure Sim module will be active where designated. 
 (3) Monitor sideslip when above 150 KCAS with RCLAWS active in PA Half or Full. 
 (4) Failure magnitudes are specified, but direction will be at the discretion of the test team. 
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Table B-5: Flight Test Maneuver Descriptions and Tolerances 
 
Pitch Attitude Capture 
Bank-to-Bank 
(Bank Angle Capture) 
Smooth 
Capture ±5˚ within ±1˚ (desired) or 
±2˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in 1 
second 
Capture ±30˚ within ±5˚ (desired) or 
±10˚ (adequate) with ¼ stick in 1 
second 
Aggressive 
Capture ±5˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or 
±3˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in ½ 
second 
Capture ±45˚ within ±10˚ (desired) 




Acquisition (coarse): stabilize within 1.5 heading carets within 2 seconds 
(desired) or 4 seconds (adequate) 
Tracking (fine): stabilize for 3 seconds (desired) or 1 seconds (adequate) 
Smooth 
Capture ±5˚ within ±1˚ (desired) or 
±2˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in 1 
second 
Capture ±15˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or 




Capture ±5˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or 
±3˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in ½ 
second 
Capture ±30˚ within ±5˚ (desired) or 
±10˚ (adequate) with ½ stick in ¼ 
second 
(1) CR: 20,000 feet / 235 KCAS 
(2) PA: 16,000 feet / 8.1 degrees AOA 
Entry conditions for all maneuvers are straight and level, ±1000 feet altitude, ±10 KCAS airspeed, and 
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FCS CHANGES 
Changes to the Flight Control System software between versions 10.1, 10.3, and 
10.5.1 are described below and summarized in Table C-1. 
 
VERSION 10.3 = V10.1 + the following: 
a. Added a number of TACAN/VORTAC/INS waypoint coupled-steering modes. 
b. Added a source-error correction table for use when airplane is configured with 
Recce nose. 
c. Added Memory Inspect of Unpopulated 701e Memory, which corrects a lab-test 
only problem which caused all 4 FCC channels to go into a fault routine that 
equates to MECH/OFF/OFF mode (can be manually reset). 
 
VERSION 10.5.1 = V10.3 + the following:  
a. Takeoff Trim Button Stabilator Setting, which changes takeoff trim button 
setting from 4˚ TEU trim to 12˚ TEU trim. 
b. Flight Control System Actuator Signal Recovery Logic, which changes FCS 
hydraulic pressure recovery logic from time-proportional resumption (5 
seconds) of actuator command to rate-proportional command. 
c. Air Data Sensor FCC Channel Tracking, which adds a PBIT test and BLIN 
codes to improve failure isolation of miss-track between two FCC channels for 
both Qc and Ps ADC data. 
d. Uncommanded Yaw With Loss of Rudder Toe-In Due To Rudder Actuator 
Failure, which modifies the fade-to-zero rudder toe-in command schedule of 
good rudder to better match the time for the failed rudder to move to the faired 
position. 
e. Jammed Angle-Of-Attack Probe Fault Detection, which changes flight-control 
AOA redundancy management to use an alternate AOA reference if a probe-
split is detected while the aircraft is weight-on-wheels. 
ENVELOPE CHANGES 
There are no changes to the NATOPS flight envelope between FCS versions 10.1, 
10.3, and 10.5.1. 
APPLICABLE WARNINGS/CAUTIONS/NOTES 
With FCS v10.3 and below, if an AOA probe split greater than 15.5 deg occurs, 
FCC AOA is set to the last valid value before the split occurred.  During field takeoffs a 
single probe jammed at a large AOA can significantly delay nose wheel liftoff.  
Depending on the last average value selected by the FCC, the pilot may not be able to 
counter this FCC feedback, even with full aft stick.  Aircrew should pay particular 
attention to projected nose wheel liftoff speed and maximum abort speed. 
A warning was added to the test plan that states: “If the damaged/stuck AOA 
probe is stuck at greater than 30 degrees, the stabilators are commanded to full nose down 
and there is insufficient control stick authority to recover the aircraft”  
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Table C-1: Summary of 10.1/10.3/10.5.1 FCS Differences 




 Actuator signal recovery logic 
changed to resume actuator 
command when reset 
 Added air data sensor channel 
tracking between partner 
channels 
 Modified fade-to-zero rudder 





 Added AOA probe fault 
detection logic 
Takeoff Trim  Takeoff trim setting changed 












For FCS versions 10.1 through 10.5.1, cross control inputs are prohibited above 
150 knots with flaps FULL. This prohibition is due to the possibility of building sideslip.  
With the RCLAWS engaged, the FSFCC is capable of commanding a cross control 
situation above 150 KCAS, possibly violating this prohibition.  For this reason, the 
project flight clearance allows cross control inputs above 150 KCAS with the ground 
team monitoring sideslip.  The monitoring engineer will call knock-it-off in the event that 
sideslip meets or exceeds 10 degrees during any maneuver. 
APPLICABLE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES CHANGES 
For any in-flight or ground emergencies, disengage the FSFCC with the paddle 
switch and follow NATOPS procedures.  In the event of a departure from controlled 
flight with v10.1, spin arrows may rapidly cycle left/right during highly oscillatory post-
stall gyrations, spins, or spin recovery.  If cycling of command arrows continues and a 
spin is confirmed, Spin Recovery Mode (SRM) should be manually selected.  For both 
intermediate and high yaw rate spin mode recoveries, removal of the command arrows 
from the SRM display may be delayed a few seconds after spin yaw rate has stopped and 
the AOA warning tone is no longer present.  Under these conditions, maintaining full 
lateral stick until the command arrow disappears may delay spin recovery, lead to a 
redeparture, and lead to excessive altitude loss (1000 to 2000 feet).  When the pilot has 
confirmed that yaw rate has decreased to zero, anti-spin controls should be neutralized, 
 
 83  
even if a sustained command arrow is present.  This minimizes altitude loss during 
recovery.  Higher yaw rates lead to longer command arrow delays during spin recovery. 
 
 













Appendix D: DETAILED METHOD OF TEST 
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FSFCC CHECKOUT 
Each time the FSFCCs are installed, a set of BITs will be performed.  The general 
procedure will be as follows: 
1. Ensure the aircraft is free of flight control failures prior to the installation of 
FSFCCs: 
Prior to the installation of the FSFCCs, a Flight Controls pre-flight IBIT and a 
full Maintenance BIT will be run on the project aircraft.  Any Flight Controls 
X’s or BLIN codes will be recorded.  The test team will analyze any BLIN 
codes to determine whether any FCS degrades will compromise the value of 
the rest of the checkout. 
2. Verify proper FSFCC operation in the project aircraft using pre-flight Initiated 
BIT and Maintenance BIT prior to flight: 
The production FCCs will be removed from the project aircraft, and the 
FSFCCs will be installed.  A flight controls Initiated BIT and Maintenance 
BIT will be performed.  The operator will record any flight controls X’s or 
BLIN codes and report them to the test team. 
 
PREFLIGHT FSFCC CHECKS 
The following checks will be performed by the pilot prior to each flight (DAF 
sequences are valid for FSFCC v3.1.6): 
1. Verify MC OFP via the software configuration page. 
2. Verify the FSFCC production software via the software configuration page.  Both 
FCCA and FCCB should indicate 991. 
3. Verify FSFCC research software version via memory inspect. 
4. Enable DAF. 
5. Enable FTFCS display. 
6. Program the DAF push tiles “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” to command [table, row] 
numbers [1,1], [2,2], [3,3], and [4,4], respectively. 
7. Attempt to arm the FSFCC mode “DDBCCB”, right aileron fail to 30 deg TEU 
absolute.  The FSFCC cannot be armed on the ground without using the Ground 
Test settings.  The pilot will verify the fail to arm in the cockpit and the flight 
controls engineer at RTPS will verify the proper fail to arm indications are 
displayed at RTPS. 
8. Enter FSFCC mode “CCCBBC”, Ground Test Mode without envelope checks 
ON, and engage mode “A”, Slimmed Replication mode.  Both the pilot and 
engineers will verify they see the proper engage indications, and the engineers at 
RTPS will give a “Disengage” call.  The pilot will press the paddle switch, and 
both the pilot and engineers at RTPS will verify the system disengages and the 
proper indications are provided. 
9. Enter FSFCC mode “CCCBBB” to turn Ground Test Mode OFF. 
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TAKEOFF 
Takeoff will be performed in accordance with NATOPS except for the addition of 
the following two steps. 
1. Ensure stabilator trim is set to 12 degrees TEU. 
2. Ensure production FCS page is displayed. 
3. Above 50 KCAS during the takeoff roll, cross check the L/R AOA probe 
indications on the FCS display.  Abort the takeoff if either left or right AOA is 
outside the range of ±10 degrees, or if the split between left and right exceeds 
10 degrees. 
 
FSFCC AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE LOGIC VERIFICATION PROCEDURE 
During the first flight of the test program, the FSFCC automatic disengage logic 
will be verified prior to the execution of any test points. The disengage logic verification 
procedure may be accomplished enroute to the range area or after established in the range 
area at or above 15,000 feet MSL, at approximately 235 KCAS.  The pilot will engage 
the FSFCC prior to each of the following steps in 1.0 g level flight and verify that the 
FSFCC disengages appropriately during each step. The disengage logic verification 






Set Yaw Rate disengage limits to ±5 degrees/second and Nz disengage limits 
to +3.0/0.0 g. 
Pedal Input (full rudder deflection to exceed ±5 degrees/second yaw rate 
disengage limit). 
+ 3.2 g steady state pull-up. 
–0.5 g steady state pushover. 




Integrated Test Set 
 
Description: 1. Pitch Doublet 
 2. Pitch Attitude Capture 
 3. Bank-to-Bank Rolls 
 4. Heading Capture (may or may not be performed based on test 
team’s assessment of value added) 
 




Description: 1. Establish the specified initial conditions. 
 2. Perform a ¼ stick (<1-g disturbance) sinusoidal longitudinal stick 
doublet and allow subsequent motions to subside or pitch 
oscillation amplitude to double before making any further control 
inputs. 
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 3. If motion is controllable and well damped, repeat with ½ stick 
input (<1-g disturbance). 
 
Success Criteria:  • Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of 
specified initial conditions. 
 • Stick doublet input symmetric within 1/4 in. 
 • Total doublet time is greater than 1/2 second. 
 • Less than 1-g disturbance. 
 • Motions subsided when either damped to less than 2% of 
disturbance, fifth oscillation, or motion results in angle twice that 
of released condition. 
 
Purpose:  • Controllability 
 • Magnitude of longitudinal/lateral/directional coupling 
 • Longitudinal stability 
 
Rationale: • Buildup maneuver to check longitudinal characteristics. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 Desired: 
 • No yaw or roll coupled motions. 
 • No PIO tendency. 
 
 Adequate:  
 • Yaw or roll coupled motions are minor and predictable. 
 • Bounded PIO damps immediately if input is relaxed. 
 
 Controllability: 
 • Any unexpected or unpredictable normal acceleration or pitch rate 
response which requires full stick to counter. 
 • Any divergent PIO. 
 • Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed. 
 • Uncontrollable coupled roll or yaw response. 
 
Pitch Attitude Capture 
 
Description: 1. Establish the specified initial conditions. 
 2. Using a fixed pipper-type reference on the HUD and in a smooth, 
non-aggressive manner (Δg ≤ 2 g in 1 second) attempt to acquire a 
± 5 degrees pitch attitude change. 
 3. Re-establish the initial trim conditions. 
 4. In a moderately aggressive manner (Δg ≤ 2 g in ≤ 1/2 second) 
attempt to acquire a ± 5 degrees pitch attitude change. 
 
Note: Pitch attitude captures should only be performed in a wings 
level attitude.  The tendency for PIO must be explored by 
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aggressively zeroing the error between pipper and desired pitch 
attitude.  If stabilization or PIO problems develop, lowering the 
input rate is allowable but should be cited as pilot compensation 
and described. 
 
Success Criteria:  • Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of 
specified initial conditions. 
 
Purpose: • Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) tendencies. 
 
Rationale: • Pitch attitude changes of ± 5 degrees are appropriately 
accomplished with smooth inputs defined in terms of a Δg ≤ 2 g in 
1 second onset rate.  Faster pitch attitude changes (Δg ≤ 2 g in ≤ 1/2 
second) also need be evaluated, but large, fast inputs are 
unreasonable with a degraded flight control system. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 Desired: 
 • Acquire target pitch attitude within ± 1 degrees for smooth inputs 
and within ± 2 degrees for more aggressive inputs 
 • No yaw or roll coupled motions. 
 • No PIO tendency. 
 • Overshoots do not exceed 4 degrees. 
 
 Adequate:  
 • Acquire target pitch attitude within ± 2 degrees for smooth inputs 
and within ± 3 degrees for more aggressive inputs 
 • Bounded PIO damps immediately if input is relaxed. 
 
 Controllability: 
 • Any unexpected or unpredictable normal acceleration or pitch rate 
response which requires full forward stick to counter. 
 • Any divergent PIO. 
 • Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed. 




Description: 1. Establish the specified initial conditions. 
 2. Smoothly roll the aircraft and attempt to capture a 30 degrees bank 
angle (15 degrees in PA1/2 or PA). 
 3. Smoothly roll the aircraft and attempt to capture the opposite 30 
degrees bank angle (15 degrees in PA1/2 or PA). 
 4. Smoothly roll back to the wings-level attitude and re-establish the 
initial conditions. 
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 5. Aggressively roll the aircraft and attempt to capture a 45 degrees 
bank angle (30 degrees in PA1/2 or PA). 
 6. Aggressively roll the aircraft and attempt to capture the opposite 
45 degrees bank angle (30 degrees in PA1/2 or PA). 
 7. Aggressively roll back to the wings-level attitude and re-establish 
the initial trim condition. 
 
Note: Roll attitude should be acquired and maintained 
using the same input rate used to start the roll to zero any error 
between desired and actual roll attitude.  Smooth input implies ≈ 1 
second to reach 1/4 stick input.  Aggressive input implies a 1/2 
lateral stick input in ≤ 1/4 second.  After the initial input, any error 
should be corrected by the pilot in the minimum time possible.  If 
stabilization or PIO problems develop, lowering the input rate is 
allowable but must be cited as pilot compensation and described.  
The HUD and the outside visual scene should be used jointly to 
judge the roll angle. 
 
Success Criteria: • Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of 
specified initial conditions. 
 • Specified lateral stick within 1/4 second for abrupt inputs. 
 
Purpose: • Roll mode characteristics 
 • PIO tendencies 
 
Rationale: • Mission representative flying qualities task. 
 • Smooth lateral stick inputs are normal for small bank angle 
changes while aggressive lateral stick inputs are common for large 
bank angle changes. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 
 Desired: 
 • Acquire specified bank angle within ± 5 degrees (± 2 degrees in 
PA1/2 or PA) for smooth inputs and within ± 10 degrees (± 5 
degrees in PA1/2 or PA) for aggressive inputs. 
 • No PIO tendency. 
 • No coupled pitch motion. 
 
 Adequate:  
 • Acquire specified bank angle within 10 degrees (± 4 degrees in 
PA1/2 or PA) for smooth inputs and within ± 20 degrees (± 10 
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 • Any roll acceleration after roll input is removed which requires full 
opposite stick to counter 
 • Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed 
 • Uncontrollable coupled pitch response 
 • Uncontrollable coupled yaw response 




Description: 1. Establish the specified initial conditions. 
 2. Smoothly initiate a level turn at 30 degrees bank angle (15 degrees 
in PA1/2 or PA). 
 3. Smoothly roll out of the turn to capture the desired heading. 
 
Note: Smooth input implies ≈ 1 second to reach 1/4 
stick input.  If stabilization or PIO problems 
develop, lowering the input rate is allowable but 
must be cited as pilot compensation and 
described. 
 
Success Criteria: • Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of 
specified initial conditions. 
 
Purpose: • Roll mode characteristics 
 • PIO tendencies 
 
Rationale: • Mission representative flying qualities task. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 
 Desired: 
 • Acquire intended heading within ± 3 degrees (± 2 degrees in PA1/2 
or PA) 
 • No PIO tendency. 
 • No coupled pitch motion 
 
 Adequate:  




 • Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed 
 • Uncontrollable coupled pitch response 
 • Divergent PIO 
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TRACKING TASK 
Guns Tracking Exercise 
 
Description: 1. Direct the target aircraft to establish 230 KCAS in straight and 
level flight at 20,000 feet Hp and then establish a position 
approximately 3,000 feet in trail of target. 
 2. Verify "speed and angels set" then direct the target to commence a 
1.5 to 2.0 g level turn.  
 3. Establish the test aircraft in a guns tracking position and then direct 
the target aircraft to begin mild vertical maneuvering, maintaining 
200 to 250 KCAS and a pitch attitude within ±15 degrees of 
horizon while the test aircraft attempts to maintain a guns tracking 
solution. 
 
Success Criteria: • Test team satisfaction with maneuver set-up and conduct. 
 
Purpose: • Evaluation of high-gain task, applicable to aerial refueling. 
 
Rationale: • Mission representative task 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 Desired: 
 • On acquisition, stabilize the heading caret within one and one-half 
carets (about 25 mils) of the target within 2 seconds of initial input. 
 • For fine tracking maintain pipper anywhere on the target aircraft 
for more than 3 seconds on each attempt. 
 • No PIO Tendencies during acquisition or fine tracking. 
  
 Adequate: 
 • On acquisition stabilize the heading caret within one and one-half 
carets (about 25 mils) of the target within 4 seconds of initial input. 
 • Maintain pipper on the target aircraft for more than 1 second on 
each attempt. 
 • No PIO Tendencies. 
  
 Controllability: 
 • Any undesired, unexpected, or unpredicted aircraft response. 
 • Any PIO which diverges when input is relaxed. 




Description: 1. Establish On-speed AOA and a -4 degrees flight path angle at the 
top of the test altitude band. 
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 2. Commence the waveoff by advancing throttles to MIL and 
maintaining On-speed AOA without re-trimming until reaching 10 
degrees pitch attitude in a positive rate of climb. 
 Variation: 
 Repeat, but advance throttles to MAX. 
 
Success Criteria: • Initial approach AOA stabilized ± 0.3 degrees (1/4 E-bracket) 
 • AOA held within ± 1.2 degrees (E-bracket) throughout waveoff 
maneuver 
 
Purpose: • Flying qualities on approach and waveoff. 
 • PIO tendencies 
 
Rationale: • Standard VPA approach. 
 • A 1.2 degrees AOA variation corresponds to top and bottom of the 
HUD E-bracket. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 Desired: 
 • AOA maintained within 1/2 E-bracket 
 • No objectionable pitch attitude transients or oscillations 
 • Roll attitude maintained ± 1 degree 
 • No roll/yaw coupled motion 
 • No PIO tendencies 
 
 Adequate: 
 • AOA maintained within E-bracket 
 • Pitch transients ≤ 1 degree and easily damped 
 • Roll attitude maintained ± 3 degrees 
 • Any roll/yaw coupled motions bounded ≤ 3 degrees and well 
damped 
 
Simulated Single Engine Waveoff 
 
Description: Waveoff from Simulated Single-Engine Approach: 
 1. Establish On-speed AOA and a -4 degrees flight path angle at the 
top of the test altitude band with either engine at FLIGHT IDLE in 
the SSE configuration. 
 2. Commence the waveoff by selecting MIL thrust on the operating 
engine, maintain approach AOA and heading with no more than 5 
degrees bank angle into the operating engine until reaching 10 
degrees pitch attitude in a positive rate of climb. 
 3. Terminate maneuver by lowering AOA and reducing the throttle 
on the operating engine to FLIGHT IDLE (match the simulated 
failed engine thrust setting). 
 4. Match throttles at PLF. 
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 Variation: 
 Repeat with MAX thrust.  
 
Success Criteria: • Approach AOA within 1/2 E bracket 
 • Roll attitude ≤ 5 degrees 
 • Inputs maintained until positive rate of climb established 
(performance allowing) 
 
Purpose: • Emergency maneuver technique 
 • Flying qualities evaluation 
 
Rationale: • Maintain heading and/or control lateral drift critical during 
shipboard waveoff maneuvers. 
 • Approach AOA range realistic for emergency recovery conditions. 
 
Flying Qualities Criteria: 
 Desired: 
 • AOA maintained within 1/2 E-bracket 
 • No apparent pitch attitude transients or oscillations 
 • Roll attitude maintained ± 1 degree 
 • No roll/yaw coupled motion 
 • No PIO tendencies 
 
 Adequate: 
 • AOA maintained within E-bracket 
 • Pitch transients ≤ 1 degree and easily damped 
 • Roll attitude maintained ± 3 degrees 




 • Any PIO oscillations bounded and damp out when control input is 
relaxed 
 • Roll attitude maintained within ±10 degrees 
 • Roll/yaw coupled motions easily controlled 
 • Sideslip ≤ 10 degrees 
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